

27 September 2011

Report of the  
Chief Constable

## **DEPLOYMENT OF POLICE SUPPORT UNITS IN RESPONSE TO NATIONAL UNREST**

### **PURPOSE OF THE REPORT**

1. This report is intended to inform members of the response by Humberside Police in the provision of mutual aid to support national policing (specifically the Metropolitan Police and Greater Manchester Police) during August and September 2011.

### **BACKGROUND**

2. On Saturday 6 August a peaceful protest was held on the streets of Tottenham following the police shooting of a local male. The protest later degenerated into violence with large scale public disorder reported in a number of London Boroughs. The scale of the disorder was unprecedented and continued to escalate over consecutive evenings with similar 'copy cat' style incidents reported nationally including Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester and Bristol.
3. Similar incidents of disorder could not be discounted in the Humberside area and Operation Augusta was put in place to ensure resilience to any sporadic outbursts of disorder locally.
4. During the period from 9<sup>th</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup> August inclusive and 27<sup>th</sup> to 29<sup>th</sup> August inclusive, Operation Augusta saw the in Force deployment of a total of 17 Public Support Units (PSU<sup>1</sup>), supported by Silver and Bronze Command Teams<sup>2</sup> and all available resources from both the Dog and Mounted Section. The indicative cost of this operation is £110k.
5. In Force deployments were co-ordinated by the Force Operations Planning team, working in partnership with the Force Divisional Planning Units. Staff were sourced from across Divisions on an equitable basis working to the Force Mobilisation Plan and supported by Branches.
6. Locally, this involved some disruption to officers and staff, many of whom worked extended tours of duty and had days off cancelled. The small number of officers who work in specialised areas such as training, criminal justice and specialist crime were used in uniform on the frontline. This undoubtedly had an impact on existing work but the Force priority remained to ensure that the public were reassured and felt safe during the uncertainty of national disorder.
7. Humberside Police also assisted the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and Greater Manchester Police (GMP) with the deployment of PSUs in response to

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<sup>1</sup> PSU consists of 3 personnel carriers with 1 Inspector, 3 Sergeants, and 21 Constables in protective equipment including shields and batons.

<sup>2</sup> Bronze Command Team consists Bronze Commander, Public Order Tactical Advisor, Driver & Scribe

requests for mutual aid from those Forces. Due to the ongoing nature of Operation Augusta, careful consideration was given to in Force requirements prior to staff being offered for mutual aid. All deployments out of Force were approved by a Chief Officer and collated by the Force Operations Planning team.

8. Humberside Police provided in total 7 PSUs and one Bronze Command Team to the MPS between 9 August and 11 September 2011. The indicative cost of these deployments is in the region of £625k.
9. A further 2 PSUs were deployed to GMP between 9 August and 10 August 2011. The indicative cost of these deployments is in the region of £20k.

#### **OPTIONS, RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES**

10. Not applicable.

#### **POLICING PLAN AND PERFORMANCE**

11. Humberside Police supported the national policing operation whilst maintaining business as usual in Force.

#### **IMPACTS ON OR LINKS TO COLLABORATION**

12. Not applicable.

#### **FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS**

13. Mutual aid was provided by Humberside Police as outlined in paragraphs 5 and 6, which identify the initial estimated expenditure in relation to staff wages and associated costs.
14. The Force is collating all costs incurred by the provision of mutual aid. There are currently national negotiations taking place and it is anticipated that all external expenditure will be recovered under an agreed mutual aid cost recovery process.
15. The Force will seek to meet in Force costs (see para 4) to resource Operation Augusta from the Special Incident Reserve once the final costs are known. If by the end of the current financial year the SIR is expended then the costs will be managed within the overall year end position of the 2011/12 budget.

#### **LEGAL IMPLICATIONS**

16. Not Applicable.

#### **EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS**

17. Not Applicable.

## **CONCLUSION**

18. Through Operation Augusta, the Force has been able to respond robustly to the threat of public disorder and criminality in the Humberside Police area, whilst supporting other Force requests for mutual aid. The Force operated on the basis of 'business as usual' whilst providing a dedicated specialist public order capability in addition to normal policing levels, available for immediate deployment locally – or (with Chief Officer approval) in support of other Forces.
19. In the busiest periods, the Force was committed to 5 PSUs actually deployed at any one time, this being the Humberside Police maximum national commitment. The duration of the Operation did not result in any increase in demand or reductions in performance.
20. A national review of public training, tactics and deployments is currently underway, which will undoubtedly have implications for all forces, including Humberside Police.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

21. It is recommended that Members:
  - (i) Note the content of the report.
  - (ii) Highlight any concerns by exception.

**TIM S HOLLIS**  
**Chief Constable**