

**Inspection of East Riding (C Division) BCU
Humberside Police
February 2004**



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Introduction

1. The Inspection of East Riding BCU (C Division) of Humberside Police was conducted by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary between 9 and 13 February 2004.

2. There are over 300 basic command units (BCUs) in England and Wales and no two are alike. They vary in size from a little over 100 officers to over 1,000; some serve densely populated, ethnically diverse inner cities, whilst others cover vast tracts of sparsely populated countryside. What they do share are some key aims and objectives, specifically to work with partner agencies on reducing crime in their areas and to do so with integrity. Scrutiny of police performance is shifting from aggregate force outcomes to the performance of individual BCUs, with the recognition that policing is essentially a locally delivered service. However, BCUs are not islands – they operate within a framework of policy and support determined by headquarters based chief officer teams. The precise configuration of policing units and the balance of resources between HQ and BCUs varies across the 43 forces in England and Wales.

3. The focus on reducing crime is likely to be relentless. Forces and police authorities, working with local authorities and other community safety partners, will need to raise their game year after year. Indeed, the statutory regime of Best Value demands 'continuous improvement' and an array of sanctions exist if authorities fail to deliver this. The government recognises the need for additional resources in the fight against crime and the comprehensive spending review 2002-05 is intended to build upon the generous settlement received by the police service nationally in the previous spending round. More police officers, better communications and information technology and ever more sophisticated forensic techniques should all enhance police effectiveness. However, the potential for the service as a whole to deliver better results in crime reduction and detection cannot conceal an inescapable fact – that performance between BCUs operating in similar policing environments and with comparable resources varies to a degree that is at times remarkable.

4. Leadership by BCU commanders and their senior management teams is an important determinant of BCU effectiveness. The responsibilities of command are significant, and some superintendents are not well supported in terms of the strength of their management teams and/or the quality of support from headquarters. Without exception, staff in pilot sites wanted their management teams to be more visible and accessible. 'Leadership' is an intangible concept, but one outcome from BCU inspections should be a better understanding of the practical manifestations of effective leadership.

5. In trying to make sense of the variations in operational performance, which exist – to different degrees – in every force, a key ingredient is *focus*. The best performers focus the efforts of their staff through timely, dynamic local briefings and tasking, which are supported by a well-managed intelligence system. They set targets and make sure that staff are aware of them, they communicate results and celebrate success, and they hold individuals to account for how they use their time. In some BCUs this performance culture is absent, reflected in the fact that the performance development review (PDR) system of setting and monitoring individual goals is in

abeyance. A nationwide rolling programme of inspections that focus on performance and leadership is thus likely to produce an upturn in results.

Note

For consistency the term Basic Command Unit (BCU) will be used throughout this report, albeit that within Humberside Police local policing is delivered through a district and local policing team (LPT) structure.

Overview

1. The Humberside Police area covers approximately 3,538 square kilometres and has a population of over 881,000. The resident minority ethnic population is estimated to be approximately 1.6% of the total.
2. The Force employs around 2,100 police officers, 979 police staff and 218 special constables.
3. The county is divided into four policing basic command units (BCUs), which are known locally as divisions. There are four unitary local authorities in the Force area and their boundaries are coterminous with the boundaries of the BCUs.
4. The Force is headed by the chief officer group, which has responsibility for the strategic direction and control of the Force. The team is led by the Chief Constable and he is supported by the deputy chief constable, the assistant chief constable (operations), the assistant chief constable (operations support – a new post) and an assistant chief officer (support).
5. The annual revenue budget (2003/04) for the Force is £141.992m and financial management is highly devolved. Force policy dictates that police and police staff salaries, including overtime budgets, are devolved to BCU level.
6. In September 2001, the Force introduced the concept of local policing teams (LPTs) of which there are currently 39 across the Force area. The LPT approach to service delivery is designed to enhance ‘quality of life’ policing by giving a team of officers an identifiable community or area for which they have responsibility 24 hours a day. Specialist CID officers, roads policing officers and dog patrols now work alongside uniform colleagues under the command of the LPT inspector to address community needs in their local area.
7. **The LPT approach is intended to give officers the opportunity to maintain closer links with the community they serve and enable them to deliver a better quality of service to the public.**

East Riding BCU

8. The East Riding is the largest unitary authority in England, covering 2,416 square kilometres. It has a population of 413,000, with 173 towns, villages and parishes on the division, although only seven of these can boast a population of 10,000 or more. The principal centres are located at Beverley, Bridlington and Goole.
9. The economy in the area is centred predominantly on farming, tourism, petrochemicals and offshore gas storage, with a thriving port complex at Goole. Unemployment in the area runs at around 3%, just under the national average. The area has a higher than average proportion both of retired people and owner-occupied households and is middle ranking in respect of health and wealth issues, despite pockets of social deprivation in both Bridlington and Goole. The BCU has a minority ethnic population of 3,820, which represents 1.2% of the population.

10. The BCU has a strength of 489 police officers, 79 police staff and 86 special constables. The devolved budget (2003/04) amounts to £19,594,240.

11. East Riding BCU is subdivided into 13 local policing teams (LPTs) each commanded by an inspector. Uniform officers together with detectives, roads policing and dog patrol officers form the team on each LPT. These are situated at Goole, Beverley, Bridlington, Cottingham, Haltemprice, Hessle, Hunsley, Howden, Pocklington, Driffield, Hornsea, Withernsea and Hedon. The strategic intention is for all LPTs to have a base within the communities they serve, an objective reinforced by the developing estates strategy published by the Force.

12. The Inspection focused upon leadership and performance; pre-Inspection analysis of key documents and supporting data was combined with a visit to Force headquarters where a number of senior managers were interviewed immediately prior to the Inspection. The process was outlined in detail in a meeting with the BCU Commander and his senior staff at headquarters. During the week of the field Inspection almost 200 people were seen in a series of interviews, focus groups and 'reality check' site visits to eight of the thirteen LPTs. The Inspection concluded with a debrief to the BCU Commander and members of his senior management team (SMT), plus an overview of the main findings to the assistant chief constable (operational support), the latter being a new post created since the turn of the year.

Part One – Leadership

The BCU Executive Management Team

The Commander

1.1 The current Commander at East Riding was appointed on temporary promotion to chief superintendent in December 2003. He has 22 years' police service, having transferred in from Gloucestershire Constabulary in 1998. He has a broad based policing background including CID, uniform operations, training and corporate development. An experienced firearms incident and public order silver commander, he was previously a chief inspector sector commander on C Division and acted up as superintendent (operations) for nine months during a previous stint on the BCU. He served for three years as superintendent (operations) in Hull (D Division) before taking up his current post.

Superintendent (Operations)

1.2 The superintendent (operations) was promoted temporarily into his current post in January 2003. He has almost 27 years' service – all in Humberside – in a range of posts in CID (covert and investigative), traffic and uniform roles. He has also performed SIO duties within the Force.

Detective Superintendent (Crime Management)

1.3 The detective superintendent has 28 years' service in Humberside, primarily in the CID, with stints as head of the drug squad and covert squad. He has also served as chief inspector (sector commander) on C Division and uniform superintendent (operations) in Scunthorpe. He has performed Force SIO duties since 2002.

Chief Inspector (Operations)

1.4 The chief inspector (operations) transferred on promotion from West Yorkshire Police to Humberside (C Division) in March 2003. She has 19 years' service in a variety of uniform operational roles, as well as three years in the training department.

Chief Inspector (Personnel and Support)

1.5 The postholder has been performing the role on temporary promotion since July 2003. She has 25 years' service – all operational within Humberside – in uniform, CID and the major crime unit. Since 2001, she has performed LPT commander duties at both Hessle and Goole in C Division, prior to assuming her current role.

Detective Chief Inspector (Operations)

1.6 The detective chief inspector (operations) has 24 years' service in Humberside Police in a variety of uniform and CID roles. He has been based on C Division since 2001, initially as sector commander of Bridlington, then chief inspector (operations) prior to taking up his current post as line manager of the divisional detective inspectors, policy development manager on criminal justice and custody matters. He is also a Force SIO.

Detective Chief Inspector (Systems)

1.7 The postholder has over 29 years' service in Humberside in uniform, CID and criminal justice roles throughout the Force. In addition he has involvement at Force level in diversity management and the development of intelligence systems. He has been a SIO for some years. Latterly, he has been utilised on the BCU to develop the NIM and CHIS management.

Divisional Finance and Resources Manager

1.8 The finance manager has been a member of the Force since 1991. Her professional background is one of accountancy and public administration in both private and public sectors. On the BCU, she has responsibility for finance/budget matters, IT, buildings and estates.

Inspector (Management Support Unit)

1.9 The postholder has served for 25 years in Humberside Police in a very diverse range of posts. He has served in uniform and CID operational roles, in the northern command centre and as Force press officer prior to three corporate LPT commands on C Division. He has headed up the new unit since January 2004.

Strategic Management Background

1.10 In the autumn of 2003, Humberside Police were subjected to a Force baseline review and a BCU Inspection of B Division by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. Both reviews raised concerns regarding performance. (As a parallel development, HMIC conducted an Inspection into the matters surrounding the Force involvement with Ian Huntley, examining in some detail the intelligence handling process within the Force.) The family of most similar forces (MSF) for Humberside was also changed. This left the Force needing to make reductions in crime and increases in detections of around 20% in order to be within the required 10% of the MSF group average by April 2006. The Police Standards Unit formally engaged with the Force in October 2003 to assist in achieving this goal. This challenging target will require changes in how the Force operates. The Chief Constable has established 'Operation Vanguard', under the command of an assistant chief constable, to co-ordinate the Force response. He also personally reviews performance with the four Force BCU Commanders on a weekly basis. Whilst more flexibility in service delivery will be available to BCU commanders, the revised Force plan for 2004-07 re-emphasises the focus on 'quality of life' policing: locally based officers visible and accountable to the public, reducing crime, disorder and road casualties.

1.11 Previously, Humberside Police produced separate three-year strategic plans and an annual policing plan. A revised policing plan produced by the Chief Constable and the Police Authority now combines the two and covers the period April 2004-March 2007.

1.12 The plan not only covers the areas that the Home Office requires, but also reinforces the Force commitment to quality of life policing, community consultation and local policing teams and sets out why this is crucial to providing an effective and integrated police service.

1.13 The plan is aligned with the 13 priorities defined by the National Policing Plan 2004-07. The Home Secretary has identified five of these priorities as being the key to success:

- providing a citizen focused service to the public, especially victims and witnesses, which responds to the needs of individuals and communities and inspires confidence in the police particularly amongst minority ethnic communities;
- tackling anti-social behaviour and disorder;
- continuing to reduce burglary, vehicle crime, robbery and drug related crime in line with the government's public service agreement targets;
- combating serious and organised crime, both across and within Force boundaries; and
- narrowing the justice gap by increasing the number of offenders brought to justice.

1.14 Within this framework there are two underpinning themes for policing and police planning and the government expects all forces to engage in these as part of the national endeavour. These are:

- community engagement and civil renewal; and
- countering terrorism and the threat of terrorism.

1.15 The National Policing Plan also sets out the need to tackle:

- child protection;
- domestic violence;
- policing on roads;
- hate crime;
- business crime; and
- football disorder and animal rights.

1.16 The Force has added a 14th priority:

- the efficient and effective use of resources to meet all of these needs.

1.17 These 14 programmes between them make up the Humberside Police development and performance plan for 2004-07.

Strategic Management East Riding BCU

1.18 Since the inception of LPTs in September 2001 the Force has not required BCUs to draw up a local plan,. The thirteen LPTs in the BCU, each commanded by an inspector, have separate plans to address the needs of their respective communities. The focus is on 'signal crimes', burglary dwelling, violent crime, vehicle crime and street robbery. The sheer size of the BCU, with the 'fragmentation' of resources defined by the LPT boundaries makes the attainment of Force targets extremely challenging.

1.19 The changes introduced by the Force coincided with the arrival on the division of the new BCU Commander. A series of initiatives have since commenced to drive the BCU towards achieving the Commander's stated goal, which is to make the division the best performing in its BCU family group (see paragraph 2.9 below). Most significant amongst these was the publication of a ten point action plan in January 2004. It has been circulated to staff for comment and is a positive statement of intent for the final quarter of 2003/04. The plan covers the following:

- direct inputting of crime;
- major crime team;
- NIM tactical team;
- daily tasking;
- clustering of specialist officers;
- performance management;
- audit and inspection;
- communication;
- roles and responsibilities; and
- response policing.

At the time of writing the plan had been approved in its final draft.

1.20 East Riding BCU has developed a crime and disorder reduction partnership (CDRP) strategy covering 2002-05 in partnership with other public sector organisations. The priorities identified through community consultation are:

- anti-social behaviour;
- burglary dwelling;
- drugs and alcohol abuse;
- vehicle crime;
- violent crime; and
- performance management.

The latter element provides evidence of a clear focus on measuring achievement of targets within the plan.

1.21 The Inspection team found that a great deal of material had been circulated electronically to staff in recent weeks. In addition to the ten point action plan, for example, a number of divisional information bulletins, on a wide range of subjects, have been circulated via the Divisional Commander. A communication strategy has recently been published by the executive management team, although few staff on the BCU had seen it or were aware of it.

1.22 At present on the BCU, there is no clarity amongst staff about the roles and responsibilities of the executive management team (EMT). The exceptions to this are the BCU Commander and the chief inspector (personnel and support). Staff of all ranks and grades commented upon the lack of visibility of the EMT members and the perceived overreliance on electronic means of communicating information. Although there are three senior detective ranks in the division, there is some confusion over who

is driving performance against crime targets. There are also legitimate questions over some of the portfolio responsibilities held by EMT members and whether some are more appropriately aligned to other members of the team. The BCU Commander has accepted that these responsibilities would merit further consideration in light of staff concerns.

1.23 Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the BCU EMT clarify the portfolio responsibilities of its members and communicate them to staff across the BCU. These should be aligned to reflect forthcoming changes both within the BCU and at Force level and ensure duplication of responsibility on the BCU is eradicated from the strategic and operational management of the staff.

Recommendation 1

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the BCU EMT clarify the portfolio responsibilities of its members and communicate them to staff across the BCU. These should be aligned to reflect forthcoming changes both within the BCU and at Force level and ensure duplication of responsibility on the BCU is eradicated from the strategic and operational management of the staff.

1.24 The EMT meets weekly. The wider divisional management team (DMT) meets on a monthly basis and includes inspectors, Police Federation representatives, UNISON and police staff supervisors. There are no formal forums below the rank of inspector for either officers or police staff to discuss issues which can inform the decision making process. Although a communication strategy has recently been published, staff do not appear to have been involved in its drafting.

1.25 A great deal of change is anticipated on the BCU in the forthcoming months. It is apparent that staff have generally accepted that restructuring will occur. However, given the sheer size of the BCU and the existence of LPT structures, there was no sense of staff feeling an integral part of the 'BCU team', a spirit the Commander is understandably keen to engender. The changes and initiatives which will be introduced under the action plan will require staff 'buy-in'. It is essential that steps are taken to lay the foundations for these changes to occur.

1.26 In his ten point action plan, the BCU Commander expresses his keenness to implement a series of regular forums with staff across the BCU '*at which an open exchange of information and ideas can take place*'. **Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary encourages the development of such forums as part of a wider communication strategy for the division and recommends the BCU Commander revisit the strategy already published to ensure the views of staff across the BCU are reflected in it. The strategy should include a structured programme for visibility and accessibility of the EMT across the BCU on a regular basis and an identified feedback mechanism for staff.**

Recommendation 2

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the BCU Commander revisits the communication strategy already published to ensure the views of staff across the BCU are reflected in it. The strategy should include a structured programme for visibility and accessibility of the EMT across the BCU on a regular basis and an identified feedback mechanism for staff.

1.27 The Inspection team noted that management development training for inspectors will commence in Spring 2004, including operational command and team building skills. This programme will begin within LPT inspectors. In the context of managing change, Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary will await the outcome of such training with interest and encourages the BCU Commander to monitor its impact on team development within the East Riding.

1.28 In attempting to inculcate a shared vision of what the BCU is trying to achieve, the BCU Commander is keen to dismantle any potential inhibitors to the process. One cultural issue to consider is the title of the 'executive management team' (EMT) and the barrier the name can present in some quarters. **Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary encourages, in addition to clarification of roles, a re-branding of the senior team in this respect. The BCU Commander is known to be sympathetic to this observation.**

Operational Leadership

1.29 The issue of visibility of the senior management on the BCU has been highlighted above, along with the need to clarify roles, responsibilities and accountability.

1.30 In addition, it was clear during the Inspection that the precise role inspectors have in driving performance was uncertain. Working relationships appeared in good order between individuals on LPTs but there was an understandable focus on the problems on each 'patch', rather than an understanding of how to collectively contribute to the achievement of divisional objectives. Many inspectors saw themselves as supervisors of both sergeants and constables (the latter due to the frequent absence of sergeant cover) and many were attempting to act as the buffer between the bureaucracy associated with the service and their front line staff.

1.31 The manner in which the BCU is currently structured also results in a disproportionate burden on certain LPT inspectors. Those in command of the more populous LPTs (particularly Beverley, Goole and Bridlington) carry a far heavier workload than their counterparts on other LPT areas, not least in balancing the needs of staff, servicing local communities (e.g local council meetings) and providing duty officer cover across the largest BCU in the Force. This was acknowledged by all uniform inspectors interviewed.

1.32 There is no clearly defined role for the inspector ostensibly in command of roads policing issues. The concerns expressed by all ranks on this subject are developed further on in the report (see Health and Safety paragraph 1.54 below) but with several main arterial routes on the BCU (M62, A63, A1079, etc), the LPT structures currently in place do not lend themselves to a coherent roads policing strategy for the BCU. LPT inspectors - not the roads policing inspector - are responsible for those specialist staff on duty at any one time. It is often the case that a roads policing officer will book on duty at an LPT without a suitably equipped vehicle being readily available. In short, there is at present a lack of co-ordination on the management of roads policing on East Riding BCU.

1.33 All four detective inspectors on the BCU have SIO responsibility. One is in command of the family protection unit; the others provide 24 hour divisional cover supervising major crime incidents and providing advice and guidance to colleagues on a range of crime related issues. Whilst strongly supportive of uniform colleagues, comment was raised about the lack of experience of inspectors and sergeants on critical incident and scene management (the Force training and development course for LPT inspectors both acknowledges this and is intended to address it) as well as the lack of meaningful contact time with other colleagues – including all detective ranks – on the BCU. The detective inspectors all articulated their unease at their current workloads and the current capacity levels on the BCU to address the more complex crime issues. The relationships with senior detective colleagues are generally conducted by telephone or e-mail. A work/life imbalance was clearly in evidence: there were only one or two days per month when the detective inspectors could actually meet for a discussion on the problems facing the division. Other than the FPU inspector, all those interviewed were based at BCU HQ, Beverley.

1.34 A similar picture was created by the sergeants on the BCU. Those based in LPTs generated similar views to their inspectors: they were demand driven, and saw themselves as a filter between the workloads imposed on LPTs and their front line staff. One simply stated “*I see myself as a tutor constable*”. There was little sense of a performance culture in respect of how the contribution of LPTs could drive BCU performance. Comment was made about the variable skills mix amongst constables, the often adverse impact of the variable shift pattern on the smaller LPTs and the dearth of cover at uniform sergeant level across the BCU. Combined with the fragmented structures on the BCU, this often meant little or no contact with colleagues on other LPTs. Whilst obviously committed, caring and approachable, there was no evidence of how the sergeants see their role on the BCU and how they are held to account in delivering against key objectives.

1.35 The detective sergeants cover the LPTs on a ‘cluster’ basis. Aside from those abstracted to specialist or other enquiries, all work to the LPT inspectors. All highlighted the skills gaps apparent in scene management, statement taking and continuity of evidence. The lack of contact with other colleagues was highlighted (particularly with the detective inspectors) as well as the lack of consultation on issues affecting the division. The workload carried by the detective sergeants was similar to that borne by detective constables (around 20-25 enquiries each). This was not felt to be easily manageable in terms of the quality of investigation.

1.36 Overall, Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary found that professional working relationships between officers and police staff at the service delivery end were positive and mutually supportive. Clear patterns emerged, however, from interviews with all ranks and grades, concerning a lack of a coherent, resilient approach to driving performance across the BCU.

1.37 It is encouraging to note the BCU Commander's response to these issues. The BCU ten point action plan has four specific elements which are intended to draw together some of the discrete specialist resources in the division to provide more robust support to the LPT's 'quality of life' community service delivery. On 23 February 2004, the BCU was due to restructure its investigative resources as follows:

- a major crime team (consisting of 12 detectives investigating serious and series crime) will be formed under the command of a detective inspector;
- a NIM driven tactical team will also be developed to deal with vehicle crime suspects and street robbery. Nine staff (a mix of uniform and CID) will operate under the command of a second detective inspector;
- a third detective inspector will command the remaining CID officers (19 staff, including supervisors) who will be 'clustered' around LPTs at Bridlington, Beverley and Goole. This team will tackle house burglary, reactive response and be responsible for follow up interviews with those in custody for other offences.

1.38 Alongside this, consideration will be given to clustering roads policing officers at lead LPTs in order to co-ordinate response and deployment more effectively. The locations are not specified but presumably will reflect the CID 'clusters' referred to above and will centre on Beverley, Bridlington and Goole. Response calls may also be dealt with by clustering resources between two or more neighbouring LPTs. It is envisaged that this will provide more resilience in terms of resources and allow more officers to work the variable shift agreement (VSA) at times more suitable to community needs.

1.39 Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary commends this approach, which the BCU Commander has discussed with the Force chief officer team. Provided the changes are communicated effectively and a rigorous performance management regime is in place to help drive activity, the benefits to the communities served by the BCU should be considerable. Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary looks forward to examining the outcomes of any changes introduced.

Partnerships

1.40 The Inspection team found evidence of excellent working relationships with partner agencies across the BCU. Representatives from the CDRP, communities against drugs (CAD), drugs action team (DAT) and the community safety partnership (CSP) all spoke in positive terms about the initiatives being pursued in the East Riding and Hull. (The DAT covers Kingston-upon-Hull, the neighbouring BCU). The key objectives for the CDRP are outlined above (paragraph 1.20). For the DAT representation at the strategic level is through the BCU Commander, with the detective superintendent acting as senior support officer to the DAT board. At the

operational level, there are drug forums at every LPT on the BCU where the LPT inspector represents the Force. The forums have three aims:

- to satisfy gaps in service provision;
- to identify hotspots in dealing activity; and
- to localise all aspects of the DAT strategy (2003-05).

1.41 Initiatives which have been provided through the forums include ‘Cut off the supply’ campaign (using leaflets, publicity and a freephone hotline number) and the CAD scheme, which is an intelligence-led disruption and arrest campaign with three principal aims:

- high profile action against dealers;
- assist users into treatment through custody based and outreach arrest referral schemes; and
- divert young people away from drugs misuse via local youth inclusion workers.

1.42 Between September 2003 and February 2004 an operation was conducted in the Beverley BCU where a total of 60 suspects were arrested and charged with numerous offences of Class A drug supply. A wide range of agencies participated in this initiative, which had a number of positive benefits for the BCU and the local community. **Given current BCU performance in the prosecution of offenders for Class A offences, Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary urges a repeat of this initiative in those areas within the BCU identified through the NIM. Such operations need to be linked to more strategic interventions encompassing diversion and drug treatment.**

1.43 The safer communities manager played a prominent role in this campaign as she did in partnership working at different levels across the BCU. The best illustration of this is her attendance at the tasking and co-ordination group (NIM) where the Inspection team witnessed her being tasked by the chair on more than one occasion with matters which assisted local officers in dealing with specific problems.

1.44 Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary commends this problem solving approach and notes the commitment given by the BCU to the safe communities team (SCT). In addition to funding 50% of the manager’s post, the BCU funds 40% of one performance officer’s post and 100% of a second such post with the SCT.

1.45 The CDRP has five task groups which examine different problems within the BCU. One of these is charged with tackling anti-social behaviour. The Inspection team heard evidence of a two-tier approach to the problem.

- environmental concerns (graffiti, litter, public nuisance); and
- alarm and distress caused to victims by others’ behaviour.

1.46 The group is chaired by the head of housing and public protection and is a multi-agency forum which aims to define the problem within the East Riding, using other agents (e.g youth offending team) to cross reference its information and target

resources against persistent offenders. One of the key priorities of this approach is managing public expectation, since the issue is a prominent one locally. Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary encourages the BCU Commander to revisit this area in the future to examine the impact on calls for service on the BCU and the degree to which problem solving has been a success in tackling anti-social behaviour.

1.47 Multi-agency working on the BCU appears to be focused, intelligence-led and has measured outcomes, albeit that the quality and impact of partnership activity varies across the LPTs. Relationships between police and external bodies were deemed to be excellent by the partners themselves, the only concern being the relatively high turnover of officers within the BCU at senior level. The co-operation is underpinned by an information sharing protocol seen by the Inspection team, which all sides agree works, particularly in urgent cases. To further cement relationships with BCU staff, all cadets on the BCU are attached to the CST for a period of six weeks, providing valuable understanding and insight into the workings of partnership groups at an operational level. Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary commends this practice.

1.48 One innovative development is CitizenLink, a remote access facility for members of the public developed by the East Riding Council. Those accessing the link are connected via TV monitor to a call handling centre which covers a range of public services. The two sites currently developed on the BCU are Market Weighton and Howden.

1.49 These new shared facilities will be fronted by customer services network staff who will have electronic access to the council's portal and they will action requests for both local authority and non-emergency police services. The initiative will be developed to provide information and scripts appropriate initially to the ten most common police incidents. For example, customer services network will be capable of receiving documents electronically and sending these on to the police. Routine services can be requested by e-mail creating even further efficiency improvements and capitalising on the investment in CitizenLink equipment. Using this portal, staff can act as both brokers and advocates to the public including solicitors and the voluntary and community sector agencies. The isolation from services and the concerns felt in these towns because of a lack of a police presence may be partially addressed.

Financial Management

1.50 The Force operates a highly devolved financial management model, including all staff salaries. The BCU budget for 2003/04 is £19,194,240 with a further £445,600 from the government's rural funding allocation, £117,404 from the Safe Communities fund, plus BCU funding of approximately £174,586 (funds are received quarterly). Monies can be vired between budget heads as necessary.

1.51 The finance and resources manager (FRM) assesses the budgets on behalf of the BCU. The majority of monies are devolved to LPTs for those items where a degree of management control can be exercised (e.g furniture, overtime, subsistence). Everything else is controlled centrally through a combination of the FRM and the superintendent (operations), who controls the tasking fund budget (which is allocated

from the rural funding) and the BCU funding. Any allocations for these budgets are for operational purposes only, on a bid basis.

1.52 The BCU has received no external sponsorship monies since 2002. The only other significant external impact is the Force estates management strategy. The Police Authority and the Chief Constable have committed to building an LPT station in each of the designated LPT areas. In East Riding, this will mean new builds in Hunsley and Goole.

1.53 The FRM and her team have appropriate processes in place to manage effectively and the senior officers and staff on the division appear familiar with them. The one concern the Inspection team has relates to the rural funding budget, which officially has another 12 months to run. **Although there is no certainty about this, Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary urges the BCU management team to prepare contingency plans for attracting alternative funding from 2005/06 onwards.**

Health and Safety

1.54 There is a health and safety policy within the BCU and formal meetings are now scheduled monthly rather than quarterly. The chief inspector (personnel and support) holds the divisional portfolio and attends the meetings, along with the BCU Commander, the FRM, the Force health and safety officer and the staff associations. Audits and risk assessments are conducted on a regular basis.

1.55 The one area of concern encountered repeatedly by the Inspection team was in respect of police vehicles. Several focus groups (including police staff who were drivers) and the Federation offered numerous examples of marked vehicles being unreliable, specifically the engine often cutting out when on the road. There were also numerous complaints about the condition of the cars (e.g door trims coming loose).

1.56 It was clear that operational and police staff alike have little confidence at present in the main vehicle fleet on the BCU. Furthermore, the officers (one a Federation representative) stated that they were unable to wear protective vests in the vehicles. The precise reason for this cannot be ascertained.

1.57 Relevant to these concerns is the confusion which is apparent over driving classification and authorisation for officers. It was stated many times to the Inspection team that no member of staff could be certain which class of vehicle he/she was authorised to drive. This has led to confusion as to which staff are entitled to respond to incidents. It was also pointed out that the current Force policy on pursuits left officers unable to follow suspect vehicles, which at the present time has had a significant impact on morale.

1.58 Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary is conscious that the Force is already reviewing these issues and that T-PAC training for roads policing officers is due to commence in the near future. Nevertheless, it is recommended that an audit of incidents involving the marked vehicle fleet on East Riding be conducted as a matter of urgency and its results taken up with both the Force health and safety officer and the chief officer team for further consideration.

Recommendation 3

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that an audit of incidents involving the marked vehicle fleet on East Riding be conducted as a matter of urgency and its results taken up with both the Force health and safety officer and the chief officer team for further consideration.

Attendance Management

1.59 The Force attendance management policy is clearly being followed in the BCU. The chief inspector (personnel and support) has overall responsibility and the systems currently in place allow her to flag up any emerging trends very quickly. As if to emphasise the generally high morale amongst staff on the BCU, the sickness levels are extremely encouraging. The BCU is at the top of its family group (7) for police officers and around half way for police staff. Sickness levels for both groups have fallen in the past 12 months (see table below). **Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary acknowledges the efforts made by all staff on the BCU and encourages all members to maintain this commitment to ensure sickness levels remain low.**

Figure 1: Sickness absence compared with Force

	East Riding BCU	Humberside Police
Average number of days sickness – police officers 2002/03	6.51	7.84
% change compared with same period 2001/02	-27.14	-8.98
Average number of days sickness – police staff	10.04	8.09
% change compared with same period 2001/02	-15.38	- 20.71

Training and Development

1.60 Whilst training and development is taken seriously by the senior management team on the BCU, there are clear gaps in service provision.

1.61 A number of externally run courses (IT, ICJS) have been cancelled, with no apparent explanation offered. Officers at various ranks all expressed concern over applications for courses which had been approved locally but were not subsequently undertaken, ranging from surveillance training to advanced driver refresher courses. There was a general complaint about the loss of skills and expertise from the BCU as a consequence.

1.62 Skills gaps were identified at numerous focus groups, particularly for uniform officers. Many of these related to fundamental areas of police work, such as scene management, report writing, statement taking and interviews. No structured briefing or training has yet taken place in respect of NIM, although this is due to be rectified in the near future. There was also some concern expressed that officers attending incidents on major roads were not road skills trained, this included officers designated for roads policing.

1.63 Attempts to address these gaps in knowledge and skills appear haphazard. Intranet and electronic communication, from various members of the executive management team, outline what is expected but there are no robust auditing procedures to accompany these bulletins. (The best example is 'Operation Cleanslate' where all officers are expected to secure additional crime clear-ups from persons in custody. Given the problems identified in interview skills, this appears optimistic – there is no guidance on how this will be achieved, who will be held accountable for it, and the measures which will be adopted.) There is no provision for training built into the BCU variable shift agreement. On the smaller LPTs (the majority), there are only two sergeants covering a five shift system.

1.64 Other innovations yield more encouraging results. On one LPT, young in service uniform officers are attached to experienced detectives for a period to enhance professional skill levels. Whilst this is commendable, it is dependent on individuals' problem solving on their respective LPTs. It will not provide a long term solution, given the current abstraction levels and the forthcoming restructuring of the CID.

1.65 The BCU has one development officer for training, line managed by headquarters. His sole remit is probationer training - there are 56 probationers currently posted to East Riding. The development officer has recently submitted a report to the chief inspector (personnel and support) highlighting problems experienced in stage four of probationer training on the BCU. The target of 80% of the 165 core tasks listed in the probationer development programme is often not being met, due to incident demand. There is no opportunity to 'sign off' each task and deal with specific incidents owing to the sheer number of calls for service and lack of supervision in some LPTs. By stage six, some of these relatively unskilled probationers return to LPT for independent patrol, without necessarily being fully equipped for the role.

1.66 The development officer proposes a BCU tutor unit, with probationers posted to either Bridlington or Goole where the volume and variety of incidents in a more structured environment would aid the development of young in service staff. Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary is conscious that a pilot tutor unit is currently being run in North Lincolnshire and that this initiative will require evaluation.

1.67 Nevertheless, given the changes proposed by the BCU Commander in the structures and operational service delivery of the BCU, Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary considers it timely to recommend the BCU undertakes a formal skills and knowledge audit to ascertain more precisely the requirements of the new policing model. Once complete, this audit should form the basis of a training and development plan for the next 12 months.

Recommendation 4

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends the BCU undertakes a formal skills and knowledge audit to ascertain more precisely the requirements of the new BCU policing model. Once complete, this audit should form the basis of a training and development plan for the next 12 months.

Performance and Development Review (PDR) – Audit

1.68 The Force has a performance and development review (PDR) process for all staff members. The PDR is a personal development document containing specific information and documentation relating to an individual's training and development. The PDR is completed on an annual basis (at the same point as the financial year), with six monthly reviews also conducted.

1.69 Staff receive an annual review (PDR) of their performance, commencing in the case of police officers, three years from the date of their appointment and following the successful completion of their probationary period. Police staff receive an annual review. The PDR folder should contain a current review, previous reviews including interim and contain both personal and business goals linked to divisional objectives.

1.70 The Inspection team examined 54 PDRs from both police officers and police staff of different ranks and grades working within the BCU.

1.71 The audit assessed the levels of compliance with Force and national guidelines by looking for:

- completion of an annual review within the last 12 months;
- evidence of a previous review in the preceding year;
- evidence of interim reviews;
- the gathering of evidence by individuals and line management; and
- links between local policing priorities and personal objectives.

1.72 Nearly all the PDRs reviewed (92%) contained evidence of performance and behaviour, including self, peer and supervisor/manager assessment and feedback. This varied in quality and quantity but included both positive and negative examples of evidence.

1.73 In 80% of the PDRs the annual review had taken place in the last 12 months but only 66% had a previous review within a year, and only 38% had evidence of an interim review. In 48% of cases, personal objectives were clearly linked to local priorities.

1.74 There was no consistent evidence of work based assessments, with relatively few examples of performance entered. The link to business not performance

objectives was more tenuous still and in most of the development areas, there was little indication of how performance would be measured or achieved. Given the lack of supervision in some of the smaller LPTs, this is not perhaps surprising, yet on one of these – Hessle – the Inspection team found the best examples of PDR on the BCU.

1.75 In interviews, focus groups and in reality checks the predominant view given was that the PDR process was of limited value in terms of driving performance. Similarly, as a process for identifying training and development needs it was largely seen as ineffective.

1.76 Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the BCU reviews its local implementation of the PDR process, with ‘SMARTS’ objectives (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, timebound, stretching) linked to Force and BCU priorities. An auditing process should be built into the model to engender a culture of continuous improvement.

Recommendation 5

Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the BCU reviews its local implementation of the PDR process, with ‘SMARTS’ objectives linked to Force and BCU priorities. An auditing process should be built into the model to engender a culture of continuous improvement.

Grievance Procedure

1.77 Whilst most staff interviewed were aware of the Force grievance procedure, they were all reluctant to invoke it, particularly police staff. The view commonly expressed was that efforts should be made to informally resolve the matter before documenting any of the issues each one generated. There was no sense that staff were intimidated or that they risked victimisation by invoking the procedure.

1.78 The chief inspector (personnel and support) confirmed that there were no grievances outstanding on the BCU at the time of the Inspection. She felt confident that if patterns were identified, they would be raised with the EMT, where the issue would be pursued rigorously. Whilst this was reassuring, it did not address the question of how to pattern analyse issues which are not recorded in the first instance.

1.79 Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary suggests that staff are formally made aware of the grievance procedure and the first contact scheme and that, wherever appropriate, matters are properly recorded under the provisions of that procedure. The process should be co-ordinated by the chief inspector (personnel and support).

Special Constabulary

1.80 The integration of the Special Constabulary into the fabric of the BCU was highly encouraging. Those officers seen were enthusiastic and had a clear picture of how they fitted into the BCU.

1.81 There are currently 86 special constables at East Riding, none of whom are inactive. They are allocated by geographic area and are included on the duty roster and are automatically considered by supervision when planning operations. All those present confirmed that training (16 weeks) was completed prior to attendance on the BCU/LPT and that no complaints had been received on equipment (aside from the non issue of new reflective jackets).

1.82 Special constables are briefed and tasked by local supervision, outside of the NIM process. The officers have accompanied regulars on a range of operational tasks and are 'hands on' in terms of the work allocated, including house searches, arrests and prisoner escorts.

1.83 The commandant attends EMT meetings and is seen as integral to the management of the BCU. He is in regular contact with the BCU Commander on a range of issues.

1.84 The one area of concern expressed was on the lack of Airwave hand-held radios. Pool radios only are available for special constables, many of which are taken by regular officers. This can lead to problems logging in with the command and control system and the individuals spoken to by the Inspection team were reluctant to patrol without the support offered by the Airwave system. **Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recognises and supports this concern and encourages the BCU EMT to work with the management of the Special Constabulary to resolve the matter.**

Part Two – Performance

Performance Management

2.1 Force headquarters manages the data collection system for the BCU. Performance information is available to all inspectors and sergeants via the PROMIS system. PROMIS illustrates whether LPTs are achieving a target, not their actual performance. The main focus is on ‘signal crimes’ (dwelling burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime, supply of Class A drugs) and their detection, not on crime reduction or problem solving.

2.2 Whilst information is circulated, there is no monitoring of how LPT commanders utilise the data. Performance awareness across the BCU was low, with little marketing of LPT and BCU performance evident. Five LPT offices visited by the Inspection team had no such information displayed anywhere. Officers at different ranks saw their role as reducing the number of outstanding calls for service. There was little awareness of performance targets or problem solving in conjunction with partnership agencies. There were numerous references to PDR as the ‘driver’ of performance, which gives some cause for concern. Current action plans agreed between the chief inspector operations and the LPT commanders were sparse in detail and there was no standard feedback mechanism or accountability process.

2.3 Volume crime – at least until the restructuring of proactive and investigative resources on 23 February, was effectively owned by the LPT. The recent abstraction of detective constables on major incidents - now reduced to zero - has meant that serious crimes are often being investigated by uniform patrol staff. Examples include deception, serious assaults and even a stranger rape. Given the identified skills gap amongst uniform constables and sergeants in respect of crime investigation and secondary detections, this will undoubtedly have an adverse impact on performance levels. Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary will monitor closely the impact on this of the BCU restructuring.

Accountability

2.4 Since engagement with the Police Standards Unit, the Chief Constable discusses performance with the four BCU Commanders on a weekly basis, with a face-to-face performance review every month. The latter meeting is minuted and BCU Commanders are expected to report back on progress against agreed actions.

2.5 At BCU level this report has already highlighted the confusion which exists amongst BCU staff on the roles and responsibilities of the EMT. The BCU Commander is accountable for performance, yet the chief inspector (operations) holds the portfolio for LPTs, whilst the superintendent (operations) is responsible for tasking and co-ordination. The lack of a performance culture across the BCU has been outlined at paragraph 2.2 above. This is mirrored at sergeant rank, where the willingness of officers to become an additional response and investigative resource illustrates the scarcity of resources on the smaller LPTs, and the inability of sergeants (often because of the shift pattern) to actively supervise and coach staff.

2.6 These issues are being engaged by the BCU Commander, whose action plan refers specifically to performance management. The intention is to ‘cluster’

performance reviews of LPTs with a ‘divisional performance management meeting’ set up monthly to examine effectiveness against targets. Both are scheduled to be led by the BCU Commander. An audit and inspection team based within the management support unit will be tasked to examine in more detail those areas not achieving the required level of performance. The intention of the audit team is both to provide support and examine systems and compliance leading to a recommended action plan. The detail of how this will be carried out is not yet apparent.

2.7 As yet, these changes have not taken effect. In order to improve performance and accountability, a rigorous performance regime now needs to be introduced on the BCU. Data is already circulated to LPTs on signal crimes, road collisions, stop and search, complaint causes and NCRS compliance. A suite of meaningful performance indicators should be now agreed upon and developed on the BCU. Relevant action plans can then be drawn up by those actively involved, which will lend ownership and credibility to the process. Given the emphasis on LPT delivery and quality of life policing, this should include a means of measuring performance in respect of visible patrol time.

2.8 Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary recommends that a performance regime is introduced at East Riding which makes accountability for performance delivery across a range of indicators both transparent and auditable. This regime should link into PDRs for individual objective setting and service delivery. All operational staff should have the opportunity to contribute to the process.

Recommendation 6

Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary recommends that a performance regime is introduced at East Riding which makes accountability for performance delivery across a range of indicators both transparent and auditable. This regime should link into PDRs for individual objective setting and service delivery. All operational staff should have the opportunity to contribute to the process.

Performance

2.9 The East Riding BCU is in Family 7: performance for the previous 12 months is summarised below.

Figure 2: Performance compared with Family Group 7				
	East Riding of Yorkshire 2003	% Change compared with 2002	Family Group 7 average 2003	East Riding of Yorkshire's ranked position in BCU family 7 2003
Recorded crime/1,000 population	63.7	6%	69.8	8 th
% Recorded crime detected	23.5%	-0.6 p.p.	27.8%	16 th
Domestic burglaries/ 1,000 households	8.37	-11%	9.8	7 th
% Domestic burglaries detected	12.1%	0.1 p.p.	17.7%	17 th
Recorded violent crime/ 1,000 population	13.13	26%	13.4	8 th
% Violent crime detected	50.3%	-6.7p.p.	56.5%	14 th
Recorded vehicle crime/ 1,000 population	8.91	6%	8.9	12 th
% Vehicle crime detected	7.7%	0.3 p.p.	10.7%	13 th
Recorded robberies/ 1,000 population	0.35	-21%	0.5	7 th
% robberies detected	19.8%	0 p.p.	25.5%	15 th
Serious or fatal road traffic collisions/1,000 population	0.59	-3.6%	0.5	11 th

Note: This data is not validated and therefore is only provisional.

2.10 Putting the BCU performance in context, between April 2002 and January 2004 the East Riding recorded 20,799 crimes (the second lowest in the Force) with the highest detection rate at 24.28%.

2.11 In 'headline' terms, some signal crime figures are worth noting for the period covering April and December 2003. Crime has risen overall on the BCU by 5%. Whilst burglary dwelling has been reduced by over 10%, repeat victimisation in this category is up by a third, with no explanation forthcoming. Robberies have fallen by 20%, although within the context of a 24% increase overall in violent crime, where the detection rate has fallen by 10%. File submissions on young offenders are failing to meet quality and timeliness thresholds in comparison with the previous year. It is also worth noting, in the context of proactive, targeted patrols, that PACE searches

(for both white and minority ethnic individuals) have fallen by one third. No rationale was given for this.

2.12 Steps have already been taken under ‘Operation Vanguard’ to clear the Force backlog in outstanding DNA and fingerprint identification. A ‘high impact team’ (HIT) has dealt with over 450 crimes since October on East Riding. These staff will now form part of the restructured investigative teams on the BCU. The BCU Commander has also increased staffing in the crime input bureau (CIB) so that ‘skeleton’ reports can be fully updated on the system with the least possible delay. There are currently in excess of 100 crime reports (approximately one day’s worth of offences) awaiting input. The BCU is hampered by the requirement for hard copy crime reports to be physically transported to the CIB for inputting. This burden should be eased by the phased introduction of direct inputting of signal crimes from 23 February, beginning with burglary dwellings. Officers will be able to telephone details direct to the CIB. **Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary commends this development and will monitor its impact on crime recording and analysis on the BCU, since incomplete information undermines problem profiling and NIM driven tasking.**

Demand Management

2.13 Demand management is a critical issue across the BCU, given its sheer size and diverse LPT structure. Current abstraction levels are low. The realignment of proactive and reactive investigation teams is a positive step forward. The BCU Commander, in his published action plan, has gone further and outlined the possibility of ‘clustered’ response policing, whereby two or more neighbouring LPTs provide response cover across a wider geographic area freeing up ‘community officers’ to develop closer links with local communities. **Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary urges the BCU Commander to consult widely on this proposal prior to implementation, since it will have a fundamental impact on LPT service delivery.**

2.14 The above initiative (should it be implemented) must form part of a wider patrol strategy, incorporating NIM, demand management, vehicle allocation and crewing, visible patrol objectives, supervision and response. The impact of the VSA should also be taken into account when setting measurable targets for the strategy, in terms of how stretching and realistic they can be. **Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary recommends that the BCU Commander and his senior team develop a comprehensive patrol strategy through the formal consultation process on the BCU.**

Recommendation 7

Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary recommends the BCU Commander and his senior team develop a comprehensive patrol strategy through the formal consultation process on the BCU.

2.15 Call management and incident handling is a major concern for uniform officers on the BCU. This issue featured in all focus groups and the majority of interviews involving uniform staff.

2.16 The northern command centre which deals with both Hull and East Riding BCUs, handles the first instance calls from the public. Officers are either deployed via Airwave or, where appropriate (i.e non urgent calls or those not requiring a rapid response) a computer incident log is placed in an LPT 'queue'. The incident is then taken over by the LPT.

2.17 There does not appear to be set criteria for the allocation of such incidents to LPTs. There were complaints from both sergeants and constables about the lack of caller interrogation on incidents, many of which they felt did not require deployment of staff.

2.18 The BCU has three advice desks at Beverley, Bridlington and Goole where staff attempt to deal with calls in just such a way. Only Goole is a 24 hour facility. If jobs are not 'picked up' by officers, the role of the advice centre is to allocate such jobs to appropriate personnel. The interaction between these units requires definition in terms of how they link in efficiently with local supervision. When a sergeant is on duty at an LPT, he/she will allocate incidents to those officers available. If, as frequently occurs, a sergeant is unavailable, officers will self-deploy. This is unsatisfactory in that the outstanding calls for service will require some prioritisation across the BCU.

2.19 Given the proposed clustering of specialist resources and LPT response, it is an appropriate time to examine this issue in more depth, in conjunction with the relevant headquarters departments. There is a proposal to centralise the advice desk facility on the East Riding, if suitable premises can be found. Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recognises that performance in this area of response has not been found wanting but is concerned about co-ordinating of deployment and a professional response to calls for service. **Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary urges the BCU Commander to incorporate a review of calls for service in the drafting of a patrol strategy for the BCU and publish clear guidance on how any new system devised will work.**

2.20 It was noteworthy for the Inspection team that there did not appear to be a problem solving ethos within the BCU, despite the Force commitment to 'quality of life' policing. Although officers were familiar with the locality they policed, they were less familiar with the problem solving tools (e.g SARA) which Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary would expect to find in evidence on LPTs. Officers openly stated, in some cases, that they were not familiar with such applications; others who were are disinclined to submit the relevant forms owing to the time taken to complete them and have the action plans approved. The one exception highlighted to the Inspection team was any submissions to the tasking and co-ordination group (TCG), but there was no evidence seen of any such submissions and the 'problem profiles' at the TCG were sparse in detail and of poor quality.

2.21 The Force position following the recent Best Value review of visible patrol is noted (Recommendations 5 and 6). **However, Her Majesty's Inspector of**

Constabulary believes there are significant benefits to be accrued from the adoption of proactive problem solving techniques in partnership with other agencies and urges the BCU Commander to identify those staff in the BCU with the requisite skills in this discipline and champion the use of problem solving through those staff. The impact on demand levels should be audited in each LPT, with deployment conducted through TCG. Any initiatives should be audited as part of the performance review process.

Family Protection Unit (FPU)

2.22 The FPU is managed by a detective inspector with a detective sergeant overseeing six detectives, a juvenile liaison officer, a domestic violence officer, a risk management officer (whose role is the monitoring of registered sex offenders) and an officer whose sole responsibility is to deal with allegations made by patients at Linden House Hospital. This hospital is where offenders are sentenced by the courts under the Mental Health Act. Allegations are frequently made by patients against staff.

2.23 The Inspection team had a number of concerns about both the workload and the working environment of the FPU. The unit is based at Market Weighton in premises which are not fit for purpose. The building is the old police station and is soon to become a local authority customer service point. Space is at a premium with insufficient desk space and computer facilities available to staff. Vulnerable victims are interviewed there in the absence of any other local facility, but examples were provided where child victims were forced to walk through rooms being used for multi-agency meetings prior to being interviewed. When vulnerable victims are on the premises, noise has to be kept to a minimum but there is no genuine privacy either for the victim or the interview teams. Members of the EMT have been made aware of this position but thus far no specific plans have been made to address the issues raised. Nor, aside from isolated visits, have EMT members visited the unit to discuss issues with the staff.

2.24 Referrals to the unit are currently running at around 100 per month. It is the second busiest unit in the Force behind Hull. The detective inspector has a problem with abstractions. Two constables are part way through a six-week training course, at the end of which they are required to be tutored for a further 400 hours away from the unit. This puts a great strain on those left to pick up the outstanding enquiries. **Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary urges the BCU Commander to address this as a matter of priority.**

2.25 The risk management officer (a female detective) has 122 'live' sex offender cases, a far higher number than the national average. She visits each of them periodically but usually works alone and often in her own private vehicle. There is little supervision of her work. She also represents the BCU at a multi-agency forum, even though the lead on such matters is the superintendent (operations). Attempts have been made to secure an additional member of staff during the past two years, to no avail. Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary believes this is an unsatisfactory position.

2.26 The juvenile liaison officer (JLO) is a police staff member who collates all information in respect of juveniles coming to police attention in the BCU. A form (125) is submitted for each interaction, with the overwhelming majority simply filed

away. There is a considerable storage problem in the Market Weighton site, since the 125 forms are retained until the juvenile reaches 18 years of age. There is no co-ordination with any of the other disciplines within the FPU, nor is there any cross-reference facility to either missing persons or anti-social behaviour orders. LPT officers can enquire about specific individuals but searches are manual and the forms are entirely separate from intelligence submissions made by the same officers. This is neither efficient nor effective.

2.27 A similar picture is presented by the domestic violence officer (DVO). He is the recipient of domestic violence forms (913s) submitted in the BCU, some of which can take several days to reach the unit. He also trawls the command and control logs to cross-reference the material which comes in. At present, there is a considerable backlog of material, partly because of a software problem with the recently introduced electronic version of form 913. The format is illegible in the FPU and the DVO is forced to write out details by hand prior to entering them on a database which is shared with social services. This database also sits outside the intelligence system for the BCU.

2.28 Repeat victimisation rates are running at around 20% in the BCU. The Inspection team found no clear intervention processes to address this. Although the FPU are nominally accountable for co-ordinating the BCU response to repeat victims, no member of the unit is finally held to account for performance in this important aspect of a 'signal' crime.

2.29 Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that an urgent review is conducted of staffing levels and operating procedures within the FPU. This should include an examination of how records collated by the unit can be linked more effectively into the intelligence systems in use in the BCU. Clear lines of accountability for performance must be devised, along with properly managed risk assessments for all staff in the unit. Consideration should also be given to relocating the unit to more suitable premises as part of the estates strategy for the BCU.

Recommendation 8

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommends that an urgent review is conducted of staffing levels and operating procedures within the FPU. This should include an examination of how records collated by the unit can be linked more effectively into the intelligence systems in use in the BCU. Clear lines of accountability for performance must be devised, along with properly managed risk assessments for all staff in the unit. Consideration should also be given to relocating the unit to more suitable premises as part of the estates strategy for the BCU.

The National Intelligence Model

2.30 The National Intelligence Model (NIM) has been implemented relatively recently in the BCU. There has been no formal training for staff (although this is scheduled to take place later in the year). The Inspection team found there was little understanding of the NIM below the rank of chief inspector. Although most staff interviewed acknowledged its importance, there was widespread agreement that the process has yet to be embedded in the BCU. Some staff even saw it as a hindrance (e.g changes to briefing packages) and there was little evidence of deployment occurring as a result of NIM generated tasks.

2.31 The BCU intelligence manager has been in post for twelve months. He is responsible for a number of staff within the divisional intelligence bureau (DIB) and will shortly be appointed CHIS controller. Desk officers assess and 'sanitise' incoming material whilst divisional intelligence officers (DIBs) prepare packages for allocation to operational staff. An intelligence officer is also based at each LPT, although their function is less clear, in particular in terms of how they link in with the DIBs and the LPT commanders. Analysis is conducted through the DIB. Although the packages are comprehensive, there is no audit trail through which managers can track progress against action plans.

2.32 The Control Strategy published for the BCU (covering November 2003-April 2004) addresses the four principal signal crimes for the BCU: the supply of Class A drugs, burglary dwelling, theft from motor vehicles and violence against the person. Although the document is wide-ranging, the Inspection team could find no hard evidence that it is being implemented across all LPTs. By way of illustration, although the numbers involved are few, enforcement against Class A drug suppliers is not achieving the stated aim of '*increased quality and numbers arrested*'. No action plans were found at the LPT sites visited concerning target hardening and media campaigns against violent crime. Scenes of crime officers (SOCO) were frequently sent to minor instances of damage rather than signal crimes.

2.33 A daily tasking meeting is held within the DIB. This meeting was concerned with intelligence and information sharing rather than tasking. Similarly, the fortnightly TCG observed by the Inspection team did not systematically address previous actions or allocate tasks according to the control strategy. The range of tactical options discussed was very limited and the Inspection team did not witness any focus on repeat victims. The intelligence report for the BCU should set the tone for the meeting, but was not apparent on this occasion. Although a partner agency was represented (see paragraph 1.40 above), few other resources seemed to be considered. The published minutes of the meeting did not appear to reflect many of the agreed outcomes.

2.34 There is some doubt that cross-LPT boundary crime can be adequately addressed by the current system. The Inspection team also had concerns that the pre-TCG meeting held between the intelligence manager and the superintendent (operations) was effectively determining the outcome of the TCG meeting itself, prior to any discussion taking place. There is currently a backlog of intelligence submissions (form 839) dating back, in some cases, to November 2003. This renders the achieving of objectives set within the control strategy difficult, since it can lead to the TCG making decisions based on outdated information and intelligence.

2.35 The BCU Commander has published his intention to develop a daily tasking meeting, building on that already undertaken in the DIB. The stated aim is to *‘effectively task and co-ordinate divisional resources.’* At present, with the gaps in the intelligence systems identified by the Inspection team, this may be difficult to achieve.

2.36 Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary recommends that an implementation plan is developed for NIM which includes all relevant staff. Each key role and process within the NIM should be clearly defined and the control strategy for the BCU should be utilised to both drive the activities of operational personnel and identify trends in cross-border crime and criminality.

Recommendation 9

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Briefing

2.37 Briefing, tasking and debriefing of staff is essential in focusing officers to do the right things, in the right place, at the right time, and ensuring they feed in all relevant information before termination of duty. Officers should be briefed then tasked to enable them to utilise their time effectively.

2.38 The briefings observed by the Inspection team overall were of poor quality. No intelligence material had been prepared by the LPT intelligence officer. The briefing facilities were not ‘controlled’ to enable officers to focus on the material presented and there was no systematic tasking and deployment of staff. Much of one briefing was taken up simply with administrative tasks.

2.39 Owing to the variable shift patterns and the frequent absence of supervision, many officers self-brief from the BCU intranet and self-deploy, assuming they are not being directed to calls for service. Most of the LPTs visited had various forms of information or briefing logs but much of the material was out of date and there was no indication as to which officer(s), if any, were addressing particular issues.

2.40 At one briefing attended by the Inspection team, officers were presented with an IT based briefing package, which has the potential to be highly effective. The content included targets, hotspots and general information pertinent to patrol and tasking. However, the information contained within was very specific to the LPT and dealt only with priority crime issues. It was of concern to the Inspection team that there was little mention of issues that affected the community’s quality of life. In one LPT, a separate, paper-driven system, was in place to address this type of issue. It

was noted that a staggered shift system inevitably means that a number of briefings, or self-briefings, take place during the course of the day. **Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary urges the BCU Commander to adopt the national briefing model to ensure briefing and debriefing of operational staff is conducted to a minimum standard. This model should be integral to the implementation of NIM across the BCU.**

DNA Sampling and Forensic Management

2.41 DNA samples must be taken from all detainees who are charged with a recordable offence, unless DNA has been previously taken and confirmed on the Police National Computer (PNC) database. It is essential that samples be taken where appropriate to ensure that the opportunities to gather intelligence and detect offences are maximised.

2.42 In addition, samples should not be taken where DNA has previously been confirmed since this will incur unnecessary expenditure for the Force.

2.43 Beverley BCU has two custody suites based at Bridlington and Goole. The system for completing DNA checks is computerised. Once an offender is lodged at the custody suite, a PNC check is made to ascertain whether or not DNA is confirmed. In the case of offenders charged with a recordable offence, there is a mandatory box that needs to be completed prior to disposal of the offender after charge. This is not the case in respect of offenders who are reprimanded or given a final warning where there is an indication that a stamp is manually applied to the custody record indicating the taking of a criminal justice sample.

2.44 The Inspection team carried out an audit of the BCU's approach to DNA sampling from charged detainees, and its management of DNA and fingerprint identifications. Custody records were reviewed to assess the BCU's approach to DNA sampling from charged detainees. Overall, the audit revealed a mixed level of compliance. Of 200 records checked, in sixteen cases (8%) samples had not been taken in circumstances where it was appropriate to take a sample. There was also an indication in a small number of cases that a series of noughts were being placed in the DNA identification number field, therefore negating bypassing the mandatory field. There was little evidence of an independent audit of the process. **Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary urges the EMT to ensure that DNA is taken in all cases where it is required. Failure to do so results in a loss of valuable intelligence and missed opportunities for detecting crimes.**

2.45 The Inspection team was pleased to see the work being carried out between the scientific intelligence officer and senior analyst in respect of DNA and fingerprint hits on the division. The process ensures that all DNA and fingerprint identifications are channelled to a single point of contact, who then undertakes to create an initial package that not only includes all the intelligence in respect of the offender but also seeks to 'link' other crime scenes of similar modus operandi together. These packages are then forwarded to an LPT Commander. There is a monitoring system in place that provides a performance management system to the senior management team on an exception basis. At the time of the Inspection, there were a number of hits outstanding for all types of crime. It is imperative that these outstanding hits are scrutinised for opportunities to increase the number of detections for priority crime.

There are plans for greater integration of this valuable system into the intelligence framework within the division and this is to be encouraged. It was also pleasing to note that the intelligence opportunities relating to crime scene examination were integrated into analysis through the scientific intelligence officer.

2.46 The senior scenes of crime officer (SOCO) and his team are based at Beverley, Bridlington and Goole. The senior SOCO does not contribute to the strategic intelligence assessment or the formulation of the control strategy for the division. There were also serious concerns raised over the failure of supervisors to adhere to the scene attendance policy for both burglary and stolen motor vehicles. Whilst the numbers of priority burglary crime were not high, there was a blanket attendance policy which, when coupled with the vast distances needed to be travelled, were reducing the effectiveness of SOCOs to provide a quality service. It was also of some concern that there were few motor vehicles examined within the division; of those which were, a high proportion came from a neighbouring division. The management of forensic opportunities is one of the most profitable in terms of identifying offenders. **Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary would urge the EMT to review their approach to priority crime and give clear guidance to operational officers as to the requirement to request and the deployment of SOCO officers.**

Recommendations

Her Majesty's Inspector makes nine recommendations:

1. That the BCU EMT clarify the portfolio responsibilities of its members and communicate them to staff across the BCU. These should be aligned to reflect forthcoming changes both within the BCU and at Force level and ensure duplication of responsibility on the BCU is eradicated from the strategic and operational management of the staff.

[Para 1.23 refers]

2. That the BCU Commander revisits the communication strategy already published to ensure the views of staff across the BCU are reflected in it. The strategy should include a structured programme for visibility and accessibility of the EMT across the BCU on a regular basis and an identified feedback mechanism for staff.

[Para 1.26 refers]

3. That an audit of incidents involving the marked vehicle fleet on East Riding be conducted as a matter of urgency and its results taken up with both the Force health and safety officer and the chief officer team for further consideration.

[Para 1.58 refers]

4. That the BCU undertakes a formal skills and knowledge audit to ascertain more precisely the requirements of the new BCU policing model. Once complete, this audit should form the basis of a training and development plan for the next 12 months.

[Para 1.67 refers]

5. That the BCU reviews its local implementation of the PDR process, with 'SMARTS' objectives linked to Force and BCU priorities. An auditing process should be built into the model to engender a culture of continuous improvement.

[Para 1.76 refers]

6. That a performance regime is introduced at East Riding which makes accountability for performance delivery across a range of indicators both transparent and auditable. This regime should link into PDRs for individual objective setting and service delivery. All operational staff should have the opportunity to contribute to the process.

[Para 2.8 refers]

7. The BCU Commander and his senior team develop a comprehensive patrol strategy through the formal consultation process on the BCU.

[Para 2.14 refers]

8. That an urgent review is conducted of staffing levels and operating procedures within the FPU. This should include an examination of how records collated by the unit can be linked more effectively into the intelligence systems in use in the BCU. Clear lines of accountability for performance must be devised, along with properly managed risk assessments for all staff in the unit. Consideration should also be given to relocating the unit to more suitable premises as part of the estates strategy for the BCU.

[Para 2.29 refers]

9. That an implementation plan is developed for NIM which includes all relevant staff. Each key role and process within the NIM should be clearly defined and the control strategy for the BCU should be utilised to both drive the activities of operational personnel and identify trends in cross-border crime and criminality.

[Para 2.36 refers]