

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



HMIC Inspection Report

Humberside Police Major Crime

July 2008



Humberside Police – HMIC Inspection Report

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Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

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In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Force Overview and Context

Geographical Description of Force Area

Humberside Police covers the local authority areas of North East Lincolnshire, North Lincolnshire and the East Riding of Yorkshire along with the urban area of Kingston-upon-Hull. This total area of 1,356 square miles centres on the Humber Estuary and has a population of almost 900,000 residents. The number of people served by Humberside Police increases significantly when those visiting the area through tourism and travel are included. It is estimated that 1 million people a year travel to and from continental Europe by ferry via Kingston-upon-Hull and a further quarter of a million people travel on domestic and international flights from Humberside Airport. The area maintains its strong maritime heritage, with the Humber ports of Immingham, Grimsby, Goole and Hull accounting for more than 15% of the UK overseas trade and handling more trade with the rest of Europe than any other British port.

Demographic Description of Force Area

The principal conurbations are Kingston-upon-Hull, Grimsby and Scunthorpe. Historically the minority ethnic communities in the area were concentrated mainly in Kingston-upon-Hull and Scunthorpe, with the Chinese, Bangladeshi and Indian communities being the most populous. However, this has changed significantly with the arrival of communities from Eastern European states, diversifying the population mix in Humberside. There has been a concentration of these communities in all four divisions of Humberside, but Goole has seen the highest numbers settle. The region continues to support the dispersal of asylum seekers to Humberside, particularly into Hull and Grimsby.

Strategic Priorities

- In partnership, to prevent and reduce crime and anti-social behaviour and to bring offenders to justice.
- To improve the level of public satisfaction and confidence in Humberside Police by focusing on the needs of the citizens.
- To improve public reassurance and access to policing services through dedicated, visible and responsive neighbourhood policing teams.
- To protect the public from the threats of terrorism, organised and serious crime, major incidents and criminal use of the roads.

Force Performance Overview

Force development since 2007 inspections

The performance of Humberside Police in terms of crime reduction, detection and public satisfaction has improved considerably in 2007, bringing it more in line with its peers. The emphasis for performance in 2008 is on improving public satisfaction rates, supported by a new citizen focus programme. The levels of improvement in performance have resulted in favourable media coverage that has recognised these improvements and the direction of the force following the implementation of neighbourhood policing.

The five-year business workforce modernisation (BWF) programme has been successfully started with the implementation of the revised crime investigation model,

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utilising a new workforce structure implemented in North East Lincolnshire division in February 2008. This involves a reduction of 300 police officer posts to be replaced by 400 police staff posts, supported by a revised business model. The quality and innovation of the programme have been recognised by the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) with the force being invited to become a demonstration site. (At the time of the inspection the final outcome is not yet known).

The BWFM programme has the full support of the Police Authority, with an investment of £7 million being allocated from reserves to fund the programme over a five-year period. It is projected that £5 million of savings will be realised permanently from the revenue budget at the end of five years. The programme is wide ranging and embraces the crime investigation, neighbourhood policing and response functions. The overall aim is not to reduce front-line delivery but to improve performance and citizen focus through increased support and realignment of business processes.

In October 2007, a new citizen focus project was inaugurated, sponsored by the deputy chief constable (DCC). This will be merged with the neighbourhood policing project to provide a well-structured and coherent approach to improving public satisfaction and confidence in the force, creating a similar step change in performance to that seen in the crime reduction and detection arena.

The new crime system CIS4 has been launched as part of a wider strategy of linking information systems in the force and providing ready access to data where and when it is needed. The force has started a project to introduce mobile data to provide front-line officers with more effective access to force and national databases.

A revised estate strategy has also been developed, including the delivery of new custody facilities and divisional headquarters to complement the completion of the local policing team base programme. This programme will ensure the estate is both modern and fit for purpose and reflects the improvements elsewhere in the force.

A new assistant chief officer with responsibility for human resources (HR) took up post in February 2008 and, at the end of May 2008, produced a detailed blueprint for change to radically restructure the HR function. This was in response to an earlier HMIC recommendation for a root and branch review of the function. This has the full support of the chief officer group and will be implemented in full.

Update on recommendations from Phase 1

(NB Recommendations 1 and 2 relating to neighbourhood policing and performance management will be addressed in the follow-up report.)

Recommendation 3 – Protecting vulnerable people

HMI recommends that mandatory, annual welfare assessments should be undertaken of all staff in child abuse investigation teams and all risk management officers dealing with public protection issues by referral to the occupational health unit.

Response

The force has responded positively to this recommendation and a new process and procedure has been put in place, which is overseen by the head of crime management branch.

Recommendation 4 – Protecting vulnerable people

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HMI recommends that the force vetting unit should undertake, as a matter of priority, appropriate vetting of all staff currently posted to both the child abuse investigation units and the public protection teams. In future, all applicants for these units, whether police staff or police officers, should be appropriately vetted.

Response

A business case to increase the size of the force vetting unit has been approved and a recruitment process commenced. This will mean that staff will be vetted in accordance with the ACPO vetting policy. There is still a gap in relation to protection of vulnerable adults, Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) and List 99. The force has been in contact with the ACPO lead for vetting to address this gap and ensure access to the above lists.

Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard
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Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report also details Humberside’s capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those that pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

Indicator	2006	2007	Change 06/07	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population	0.422	0.394	-6.64%	0.574
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0	0	0	0
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.056	0.079	41.07%	0.062
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	120.0%	85.71%	-34.29pp*	91.79%
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.404	0.191	-52.72%	0.109
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	2.78%	29.41%	26.63pp*	46.17%
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.370	0.393	6.22%	0.297
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	48.48%	51.43%	2.95pp	59.90%
Number of manslaughters per 10,000 population	0.022	0.034	54.55%	0.026
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	100.0%	0	-100.0pp*	44.44%
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.180	0.101	-43.89%	0.111
% of murders detected/convicted	106.25%	111.11%	4.86pp	102.84%
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	3.591	2.750	-23.42%	2.232
% of rapes detected/convicted	24.69%	24.49%	-0.2pp*	33.13%

*‘pp’ is percentage points.

**MSF for Humberside are Durham, Gwent, Lancashire, South Wales and South Yorkshire.

From the SPI data contained in the table above, it can be seen that the crime types of blackmail, kidnapping, manslaughter and rape each pose a potential threat to Humberside. The rate of offences (per 10,000 population) in each case is above the MSF average.

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It should be noted, however, that the rate of offences for both blackmail and rape fell significantly in 2007.

The number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population dropped by 52.7% in 2007 compared with 2006 to bring the force more in line with the MSF group. The number of rape offences during the same period also fell by 23.4%.


Life-threatening & and gun crime reduced from 2006 to 2007 and is lower than the MSF mean.

The SPI data also indicates that detection rates can fluctuate for these offences, but overall the rates are slightly lower in Humberside compared with the MSF average for this group of offences.

The NPSAT based on data for the last five years, released in September 2007, highlighted that Humberside faces a high level of demand in respect of the policing response to rape (see Figures 1 and 2).


Rape (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total

Figure 1




The average number of rape offences, over the last five years, places the force third nationally and the highest in the MSF (see Figure 2).

Figure 2



In relation to Homicide, the peak over the last five years was in 2003/04, but there was a recent upturn in 2006/07. The average number of homicides per 10,000 population over the last five years (see Figure 3) places Humberside second highest in the MSF and above the average for England and Wales.

Figure 3




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Humberside is bordered by two other forces that also indicate high demand for police services for both rape and homicide (see Figures 1 and 4).

Figure 4

Homicides (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total



Although OCG mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Humberside has sought to make progress by ensuring that analysis of major crime types is initially mapped. It is currently estimated that 25 local OCGs and 13 external OCGs impact the force area, across all major crime types.

The FSA demonstrates a clear understanding of the historic, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified tackling OCGs, terrorism, Class A drugs and organised immigration crime as its major crime priorities within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on the control strategy priorities and also firearms, organised distraction burglary, stolen vehicle markets and cash in transit robberies.

The force has invested suitable resources for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and to inhibit major crime. In particular, Humberside’s role in the provision of staff and intelligence to national partners is noteworthy, particularly the BIA via Operation Reflex.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates mature processes in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire are recognised, albeit they are at an early stage of development.

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Intelligence

The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, supplying dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has fully committed to its major crime investigations with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.

Strengths

- The force has sufficient analysts, including the principal and a number of seniors, which on a pro-rata basis is either directly comparable with or greater than larger forces. These resources are split between HQ and the four operational BCUs. The principal analyst has direct line management responsibility for the analytical staff working at HQ. Analysts allocated to the BCUs are locally based and managed. The only responsibility the principal analyst has for the BCU analytical staff is to keep them informed about training opportunities.
- The head of crime management branch and other senior officers confirm they are confident the force has appropriate analytical capacity and capability to fully support the MITs and the investigation of major crime. The MITs receive the services of up to two FIB analysts as required.
- The HQ-based analysts work within the FIB and focus their attention on major crime and serious and organised crime. Analysts in divisions are primarily focused on level 1 volume crime issues (see AFI).
- When a major incident considered suitable for MIT attention arises, the services of an FIB analyst are called upon. The analyst attends the major incident room (MIR) accompanied initially by either the principal or senior analyst from FIB. Analytical objectives are discussed with the SIO and the analyst works against these parameters to support the investigation.
- Very positive feedback was received from a number of MIT SIOs about the quality of the products delivered by the analysts in support of major crime investigations.
- The management of ANPR intelligence has been cited as representing good practice by the NPIA. Databases are updated regularly via technical mechanisms and encrypted networks. These IT processes ensure that force vehicles equipped with ANPR are updated immediately, thereby ensuring that front-line staff are provided with 'real time' data against which to conduct their responsibilities.
- The FIB senior analyst has given a series of presentations to detectives on a range of courses to improve the understanding of the role of the analysts and the services they can provide.

Work in progress – N/A

Area(s) for improvement

- Although the force's overall analytical provision is considered to be well resourced, concerns were expressed by analysts about how the force uses its skills, experience and training. Examples were cited where analytical staff in divisions are being called upon to research and analyse issues/problems in depth, only for their products to be under-used or not needed at all. Feedback confirmed that, on some BCUs, analysts

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can be used to perform the researcher role or to support MIT teams because they are not being tasked with BCU work. In addition, BCU analysts expressed concerns that their line management arrangements mean they regularly miss out to their HQ colleagues in terms of training. HMI confirmed that the force has not reviewed the role of its overall analytical provision since NIM processes were introduced. HMI recommends that such a review should be prioritised to ensure that the force is achieving maximum benefit from its analytical capability.

Recommendation 1

HMI recommends that a review is undertaken of the analyst's role, focus, structure, line management and budget provision to ensure the effective co-ordination and management of all analytical assets in the force.

The force seeks and shares intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. The force assessments of community impact to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.

Strengths

- The force is actively engaged in developing effective partnership working arrangements to share intelligence with a range of key partners, primarily in the public sector, eg probation service, prisons and the LCSB, relating to level 2 major crime types. In addition, some strong private sector linkages exist, eg the Tribune Trust, which is a local charity organisation supported by big business in Humberside whose objective is to impact on crime.
- The force has a homicide prevention strategy, part of which includes strong linkages and intelligence-sharing arrangements with MARAC partners regarding the identification of persons at risk through domestic violence. The force also uses the risk assessment model for domestic violence addressing separation (S), potential barriers to seeking help (P), escalation of violence (E), children (C), suicidal (S) and sexual assault (S) known as SPECSS.
- Community cohesion officers situated in each of the four operational BCUs are the focal point for the development of a community impact assessment, which is a standing action in all investigations involving the MIT. An example was cited where after a community impact assessment in Hull following the death of a young person and after consultation between the MIT and the BCU, a series of section 60 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 orders were put in place to prevent an escalation of violence.

Work in progress – N/A

Area(s) for improvement

- CDRPs, LSPs and drugs intervention programmes are used in a limited way to support the work of the force with regard to the management of certain serious and organised crime categories, eg drugs. However, these bodies are not involved routinely in the intelligence-gathering process relating to level 2 major crime types. The force may wish to consider embracing these partners in the intelligence-gathering process.
- Although there is some good evidence of the force liaising with minority groups, eg the Latvian community, for individual investigations, this is not an embedded process and further work needs to be undertaken to develop this area of business.

The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to its major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be adequate. Problem profiles for all major crime areas are satisfactory, with links to force and BCU-level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.

Strengths

- There is a comprehensive FSA that is undertaken every 12 months and chaired by the Chief Constable. This document is reviewed every six months. It addresses a broad range of issues, including precursor offences. All the major crime areas are covered, albeit not all are prioritised. A comprehensive assessment is made of areas such as drugs, firearms, paedophiles, kidnap, homicide and robbery and the force understands the risks posed by these issues.
- All intelligence products meet the requirements of ACPO guidance (see work in progress). There are comprehensive control strategies, intelligence requirements, problem profiles, etc for many major crime areas, including rape, sexual offences and firearms-related crime.
- The force has a comprehensive homicide prevention strategy that is designed to manage identified risks in order to reduce and prevent violent crime and protect the public. Areas covered include risk identification, risk assessment and risk management. It looks in depth at domestic violence and the steps to be taken to prevent escalation, including use of the SPECSS risk assessment model and the MARAC process. The strategy includes the identification of vulnerable groups, such as children and young people, prostitution, persons with mental disorder, so-called 'honour killings' and alcohol-related violence.
- A recent influx of Eastern European migrants has resulted in the force recognising the shift in demographics and the risks posed to these communities for potential victimisation and the potential threat posed to the wider community. (See AFIs.)
- Analysts are aware of the importance of monitoring 'near miss' offences as possible precursors to major crime and would identify areas of concern through the local divisional intelligence structure.
- The force adopts national best practice or lessons learned whenever possible for this important area of business, eg a prostitution strategy has been developed with key partners including Hull City Council and taking due cognisance of the lessons learned to date from a series of prostitute murders in Suffolk.

Work in progress

- Each of the BCUs is working closely with partners on the development of joint strategic intelligence assessments covering a wide range of criminal activity, including precursor offences for homicide and violent crime, where appropriate.
- The force is in the process of implementing the Every Child Matters agenda in order to maximise its contribution to children and young people fulfilling their potential and being safe.

Area(s) for improvement

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- The large influx of migrants into various parts of the force area puts an onus on the organisation to identify at an early stage the threats and risks associated with the potential for major crime, such as homicide (the MIT having already investigated a murder within one of the Eastern European communities). The force needs to ensure that its intelligence capability is sufficiently developed to minimise any such threats.
- Although there has been some excellent work involving the Rich Picture initiative, the force has yet to map all the vulnerable communities in Humberside and identify what risks and threats they may be subject to for all the major crime areas. This work will need to be effectively driven to ensure the force has as comprehensive an assessment as possible of future demands and likely high-risk areas.

Trend analysis and problem profiles are routinely shared with partners and BCUs. There is an effective trigger plan for hot briefing when there is a significant change in the major crime threat or where the nature of the analysis demands a fast time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners, such as BIA, are effective. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full MoPI compliance by 2010.

Strengths

- There is evidence of multi-agency intelligence sharing to address major crime threats at local and individual level for specific cases or investigations. There are local information-sharing protocols, eg with BIA, to cover joint working, eg Operation Reflex. This is a joint operation that is proving the value of effective linkages with other agencies, such as BIA and DWP, to tackle both serious and organised crime and all major crime areas.
- The force makes effective use of all the national databases in this area of business, including the serious crime analysis section (SCAS), Catchem, kidnap and extortion database and Genesis. The national performance chart for the comparison of codes of practice compliance in relation to submission of cases to SCAS shows that Humberside is one of only five forces recording 100% compliance. Of those forces, Humberside had the highest number of reportable incidents.
- The force can effectively respond to either a significant change in threat level or specific intelligence in relation to major crime, with trigger plans developed when necessary and effective call-out procedures.
- The force has a project team for MoPI, led by a chief inspector, and all indications are that it is on course to meet the December 2010 target with an effective action plan.

Work in progress

- The importance of effective multi-agency intelligence sharing regarding potential major crime threats has been identified by the force as a key issue and work is in progress to ensure there are effective linkages that will allow this to take place in a more formalised way in electronic format, examples being BIA and HMRC.
- Data quality is recognised as an extremely important area of business before effective intelligence sharing can take place with partners. The force considers it so important that a gold group has been established to oversee the whole area of data cleansing and data quality. This has been brought into sharp focus with the imminent arrival of CIS4 (the new crime and intelligence system).
- A force order regarding data sharing with other agencies has been ratified (December 2007) and, following approval regarding diversity compliance, is due to be promulgated to the force by April 2008. This will codify the need for protocols and/or memorandum of understanding with all partner agencies.

Area(s) for improvement – N/A

In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities at the time of the inspection was incomplete, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is only partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are not identified sufficiently early.

Strengths

- The force has acknowledged the importance of identifying the vulnerable communities within Humberside. The neighbourhood profiles that have recently been completed will inform this process.
- The Rich Picture work that has been a national requirement of the drive against terrorism has been completed and the force has been complimented by the national co-ordinator on the quality of the work.
- The force responds well to individual cases of major crime involving vulnerable communities. HMI was made aware of effective operations undertaken by the force where community concerns were allayed quickly following the early detection of a homicide in an Eastern European community.
- There is an effective MAPPA process with partners, eg probation service. This process manages the risk and threats posed by sex offenders. The force was graded good for this area of business in the recent HMIC inspection.

Work in progress

- The JSIAs currently being developed in each of the BCUs, with partner agencies coupled with the neighbourhood profiles, will provide an effective database of information on which to base further work relating to the identification of vulnerable communities.
- The community cohesion officers are undertaking a number of initiatives to develop links with vulnerable communities and improve understanding of the issues that are of concern. There was evidence of officers attending courses at local colleges to learn conversational Russian to improve their ability to communicate directly with identified groups.
- The force has recruited additional analysts on BCUs to specifically address neighbourhood issues (see MC01). It has also purchased Mosaic software, which it is hoped will assist in the mapping of vulnerable communities.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although there was work being undertaken as part of the Rich Picture initiative, neighbourhood policing and initiatives developed by the community cohesion officers, it was clear that there is still an absence of a thorough understanding of all the vulnerable groups within Humberside, where they are located and in particular what risks/harm they may be exposed to and what threats may be apparent that will impact on the broader community. It is essential that the force co-ordinates all the work currently being undertaken and ensures that firstly all vulnerable communities are effectively mapped and secondly a comprehensive assessment is made of the existing and future risks and threats to which these communities could be exposed.

The force maintains a strategic risk register, which is reviewed every month by the DCC, who oversees the force audit board. Each identified strategic risk has a current and effective action plan; however, major crime does not feature. Divisional and departmental risk registers that would monitor issues locally are absent.

Strengths

- The force complies with the government management of risk standard, which links to Prince 2 project management and methodology. Risks are identified at strategic level, programme, project and operational levels and the process is overseen by a business change manager from within corporate development branch. The collated risks are considered by the force audit board on a monthly basis as a standing agenda item and this meeting is chaired by the DCC.
- There was evidence of effective risk management at project and programme level, where risks have been identified and then effectively managed. Issues such as the impact of flooding on the estate infrastructure and IT overload at Queens Gardens police station in Hull are examples of risks that are being managed.
- The threat of corruption was a risk that appeared on the risk register in the past that would have a direct bearing on major crime or serious and organised crime. This was effectively managed and the introduction of an anti-corruption unit has addressed this issue and effectively removed the risk from the register. Currently the force has determined that risks associated with major crime do not justify inclusion on the strategic risk register but would be managed by the crime management branch.

Work in progress

- The force has identified that there is no central co-ordination or collation of risk and a business case has been submitted for a full-time risk co-ordinator.
- A gap analysis is currently being undertaken utilising a national risk management framework developed by the Metropolitan Police Service.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although it is apparent that risks identified in divisions can be raised to the force audit board for consideration via the ACC operations, it is clear that there is no risk register in each division. This situation is mirrored in the crime management branch where there is no branch risk register and no risk registers for major investigation teams, the MCU or the intelligence section. Risks relating to this area of business are identified but there is no formal process for these to be documented. The force should formalise this process and ensure that each branch and division has a risk register that identifies those issues raised to the strategic risk register and other risks that are being tackled and addressed locally.
- The issue of risk and what is being done to ameliorate the identified risks does not appear on divisional or branch SMT meeting agendas. This should be corrected and a standing item placed on the agenda of each branch and divisional SMT meeting.

Recommendation

HMI acknowledges the work undertaken at the strategic level to address risk and ensure it is mitigated, but this is not replicated at divisional or branch level in a formalised manner. HMI therefore recommends that the force should develop a risk register at each level appropriate to their area of business.

The force is creating ways of collaborating with all other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems. The force currently shares intelligence and data with South Yorkshire. Its HOLMES systems are currently not inter-operable.

Strengths

- The force has a number of NSPIS products, including command and control, case preparation and custody, that are linked via a data warehouse. A new computer system for crime, intelligence and domestic violence (CIS4), which links all three areas, was introduced in January 2008.
- A new information and communications technology strategy has been developed that acknowledges the importance of inter-operability of systems and the need to share information both with other police forces and external agencies, such as local authorities, health, social services and courts. A data warehouse, knowledge hubs and portals are seen as key components to the success of the strategy.
- The force already has the ability to exchange intelligence electronically with another force via the Lexis system. At present, intelligence enquiries with other forces is by personal contact and electronic confirmation through the respective FIBs.
- In response to the Bichard recommendations, the force set up an operation to co-ordinate the work. A plan was developed, with 56 actions broken down into 9 areas – NIM implementation, intelligence review, general intelligence matters, serious case review, technology, sex offenders and potential dangerous offenders, protection of vulnerable persons, vetting and audit, inspection and review. All actions have been completed and the plan has been signed off.

Work in progress

- The HOLMES system is, like almost every other force, standalone. However, the introduction of HOLMES 2020 should address this issue and aid inter-operability. The HOLMES manager is chair of the north-east HOLMES working group and is well respected in the field. He is developing a system with ISIS that should allow the details of nominals to be drawn from all databases.
- The force uses both mobile and fixed-site ANPR technology and is seen as one of the forces at the leading edge of this technology. A bid for funding has been submitted to the Home Office to allow the interface of ANPR databases from the Yorkshire Humber region.
- Work is in progress to forge effective electronic links with partner agencies via effective firewalls that will greatly enhance the ability of the force to share intelligence and information.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although the force has effective electronic links with one other force via the Lexis system, which allows the sharing of information and intelligence, there is no such arrangement with the other forces. A bid to address this issue was rejected by the Home Office. HMI encourages the force to continue to work closely with the other forces in the region to develop this area of business.

The force has a case review policy that is generally applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is efficient. (This refers to a live document.)

Strengths

- The 100% detection rate for all homicide investigations conducted by the MIT since its inception in April 2005, with all 'detected' within seven days, has minimised the need to conduct a formal review of the investigation at 7, 14 and 28-day intervals per major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP)/murder investigation manual (MIM) requirements. However, arrangements are in place to conduct any requisite reviews, utilising independent SIOs who work outside the MIT structure, when the need arises.
- A comprehensive review policy is in existence that covers all aspects of existing and historic cases. This explains how reviews will be undertaken and when, and it accords with all available national guidance.
- The force actively seeks to learn from investigations in other forces; the example quoted was the investigation of prostitute murders in Suffolk.
- The force would endeavour to undertake 7, 14 or 28-day reviews utilising an SIO from within the force who is not connected to the case and is outside the MIT structure; however, it acknowledges that there may be a need to obtain the services of an SIO from outside the force. The use of peer reviews is also encouraged.
- Evidence was provided that confirmed reviews would be undertaken in non-homicide cases, eg cash in transit robberies; however arrests were made within the initial seven days.

Work in progress – N/A

Area(s) for improvement – N/A

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The force tasking and co-ordination process operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historic, current and predicted demand.

Comment/background

Until the early part of 2007, the strategic imperative was to tackle level 1 volume crime issues in order to improve force performance to such a point that there was a reasonable expectation of disengagement. Force resources were often deployed to supplement divisional assets in order to address any shortfall in performance or increase in demand. This approach included the development of a force-wide tasking process designed to address level 1 volume crime issues that ran in parallel with the more conventional level 2 tasking process. Disengagement was achieved in spring 2007, but the tasking process continued in the above format until the end of 2007 to ensure a focus on level 1 performance was maintained.

Strengths

- There was criticism of the above structure and the force recognised that the level 2 tasking and co-ordination process had become too narrowly focused. A comprehensive review was undertaken at the end of 2007 and during the early months of 2008, and revised procedures and format have been instigated that are inclusive of divisions, crime management branch and operations branch. This revised meeting is chaired, and will continue to be chaired, by the ACC operations and has both an open and closed section, the latter dealing with specialist covert tactics and information of a confidential nature. This revised format, although embryonic and developing, delivers suitable responses to major crime issues.
- The FSA is a comprehensive document that analyses both historic and current criminality and also identifies emerging threats across a broad spectrum of activity, including major crime and serious and organised crime.
- There are good working relationships with the RIU and effective links into the regional tasking and co-ordination process. There is flexibility within the system that allows for rapidly emerging issues to be assessed, evaluated and resources allocated either by individual forces or in a collaborative approach among forces in the region. HMI was made aware of one regional operation addressing cash in transit robberies that exemplified these arrangements well.
- The MITs are highly regarded by the divisions and their support is welcomed. The working relations are close, with MIRs based in each division and the teams keen to assist whenever possible within their terms of reference.

Work in progress – N/A

Area(s) for improvement

- Although there was evidence from previous TCG meetings in 2007 of the effective recording of decisions for action, there was little evidence of the rationale being recorded why resources had not been allocated to particular issues. This serves as an effective audit trail in the event of any escalation or review of activity.
- Although the MITs are supportive of the divisions and will assist whenever possible, there was little evidence of this process being undertaken through the level 2

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process. At the time of the inspection, this was arranged by direct contact between the divisions and the head of the MIT. The force should consider utilising the level 2 tasking process to make these decisions regarding deployment of the MIT to assist divisions, thereby making the whole process more transparent.

Due to appropriate and comprehensive training, the force's awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent.

Strengths

- Although there is no current, specific diversity course, all staff have received such training in the past. Diversity training and issues run through each session of the ICIDP, which all staff involved in the investigation of major crime have to undertake.
- The initial management of serious crime has a range of scenarios, each of which has a diversity element. Standalone sessions on diversity-related issues are also included. These sessions include inputs from IAG representatives. The force has a comprehensive database of more than 350 diversity volunteers, including asylum seekers awaiting deportation, who take part in the scenarios.
- One specific input relating to hate crime lasts for a whole day and is based on a real life gay on gay murder. It not only highlights important investigative issues but also addresses the impact the incident could have on that particular community.
- Members of the MIT work very closely with the community cohesion officers in whichever division the incident occurs, and in so doing increase their individual awareness of diversity issues while at the same time investigating a live incident.
- In June 2007, all MIT staff attended a full day's diversity training in conjunction with members of diverse communities, IAG members and key partners.

Work in progress

- The force is moving away from standalone diversity courses to incorporate diversity as a golden thread running through all other courses. Two force trainers are to attend a 'train the trainers' course to enable them to spread diversity training through other courses run by the force training centre in a manner similar to that used for major crime.

Area(s) for improvement – N/A

Prevention

The force has an IAG and this is frequently used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

Strengths

- There are good relationships with a range of partners and other agencies across Humberside. The most effective links for major crime investigation are with prisons, probation, HMRC and DWP, many of whom have provided valuable information. Links are also developed with private sector partners including security firms dealing with the transfer of large amounts of cash, notably Securicor and Group 4, eg during a major investigation of cash in transit robberies across the Yorkshire Humber region.
- There are IAGs at both force and divisional level, totalling five in number. The head of the MIT has utilised the force IAGs to inform policy formulation regarding the impact of investigations on vulnerable communities. The local IAGs have been utilised during homicide investigations in divisions.
- The newly established KINs within each neighbourhood can also be used as a source of advice and information. They have been used as an effective means of communication during a recent terrorist incident in Goole. The force was able to inform the community very quickly of the full circumstances of the incident and thereby prevent the spread of rumours concerning the police operation.
- The focal point for liaison between the MIT and the IAG is through the relevant divisional community cohesion officer; relevant information from an IAG is recorded in an SIO's policy book.
- Confirmation was received that the relationship between the CPS and the force is strong in relation to the investigation of major crime and homicide. The CPS is involved early in the cases, communication is good and it is rare that the SIOs have not considered critical lines of enquiry.

Work in progress

- Work is currently being undertaken by staff in the new community safety team to develop the liaison with partners, including those local to each division, eg CDRPs, LSPs and DATs, regarding their involvement in local tasking.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although relations with partners are generally seen as good, those at a divisional level are focused primarily at volume crime issues. There is scope to further develop this relationship to enhance the investigation of major crime and this is a role that could be addressed as part of the ongoing work being undertaken by the community safety team.

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Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were fully understood and tested by call management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- The importance of the golden hour principles was acknowledged by all staff and there was widespread acceptance that the performance in this area of business has improved significantly in recent years. The MIT was very satisfied with the response and support it received from divisional supervisors and staff at the scene of homicides or other major crimes.
- A DI now provides force cover on nights and this has been viewed as a very positive move, ensuring there is a rapid assessment of the incident and all necessary steps have been taken to secure the scene, witnesses and evidence. The DI will make a decision regarding the nature of the incident and, if required, activate the force call-out procedures, ensuring a rapid response from the appropriate experts in the field.
- When problems arise regarding scene management, they are swiftly and effectively resolved either at the scene or between the head of the MIT and the relevant divisional commander, eg a recent shortage of loggists was resolved by better communication of the MIT’s requirements.
- Staff in the control room have access to a range of dropdown menus that identify the action to be taken in the event of a range of major crimes and the questions that should be asked of the caller. A likely major crime is referred to the supervisor in the control room or the force duty officer (FDO), who will make an assessment of the incident and make the decisions regarding call-out procedures. The FDO will also take an active interest in any incident where a relatively inexperienced supervisor is in attendance at the scene.
- Control of the scene is the responsibility of operational staff but there are a range of contingency plans available should the need arise to call out specialist assets or utilise the assistance of other emergency services or local authority services to control the scene or prevent escalation.

Work in progress

- The current call-out lists are paper based, which can cause problems updating the necessary information. However, a business case has been submitted for these to be computerised during 2008.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although there was evidence of training in the past for command centre staff relating to kidnap and extortion, it was apparent that among current staff there was a lack of knowledge regarding the identification of a potential tiger kidnap and the appropriate response to be put in place. The force should consider preparing a suitable response that would raise the knowledge and awareness of staff in the command centres regarding this particular type of incident.

The policy covering threat to life is fully accessible to staff and thoroughly understood and implemented. There are good examples of joint/regional/cross-border and multi-agency operations to tackle major crime.

Strengths

- The force has a practice direction entitled *Threats to Life – Osman Warnings*. It is a comprehensive document that contains an outline of the Osman ruling and sets out the actions required upon receipt of a threat. Response and resolutions are clearly stated within the document. A series of flowcharts is included that depicts the processes to follow at each stage.
- The threat to life process is circulated at BCU level and the personnel seen during the fieldwork element of the inspection were aware of its requirements.
- The force has recently introduced a comprehensive homicide prevention strategy, which incorporates advice and guidance on the risk management of vulnerable groups and includes specific reference to Osman warnings.
- The force uses MAPPA and MARAC processes to assess risk to victims and potential victims of child abuse and domestic violence. These processes complement the force's homicide prevention strategy.
- In instances where an Osman warning is issued, the force offers crime prevention advice and also has arrangements in place with local authorities to arrange for re-housing/re-locating of the individual against whom the threat has been made.
- The force does not consider that it is the subject of a sustained threat from armed criminals. It operates with a small cadre of authorised firearms officers, who staff the organisation's two ARVs which are available for spontaneous deployment at any time. Although this is a small unit, given the large geographic area the force covers, an assessment of demand has been undertaken and the current decision is that increasing the number of ARVs cannot be justified given competing demands for resources within other aspects of corporate business.
- In instances where there has been intelligence to suggest that violent criminals who may be inclined to resort to firearms have been attempting to establish themselves within the force area, the response from the organisation has been robust, either in terms of enforcement or deploying the MIT to identify, investigate, arrest and prosecute offenders. HMI was made aware of a good example involving cash in transit robberies.

Work in progress – N/A

Area(s) for improvement

- Between April 2006 and April 2007, the force issued 51 Osman warnings that it can account for. However, it is clear that there are inconsistencies in record keeping across BCUs in this respect and that this figure cannot be relied upon. From April 2007 to January 2008, 67 warnings have apparently been issued, but the same inconsistencies in record keeping apply. The force needs to reassess its procedures in this regard and ensure that a reliable corporate process is applied across the organisation.

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The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by on-demand covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to and understood by dedicated staff and key detective posts. The force is wholly collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.

Strengths

- The force operates with a WPU that is incorporated within the HQ-based DSU. All staff within the unit have been witness protection trained. They accommodate WPU duties on a part-time basis, alongside their core DSU responsibilities, due to the low level of demand from the force for this service. They undertake their witness protection duties in plain clothes, utilising safe locations for meetings with their clients and undertaking all arrangements in methods that do not help reveal their true identity.
- The WPU has good working arrangements with other forces both nationally and regionally. Assistance is readily obtained and given. (See AFIs.)
- The force has a witness protection policy that has been reviewed within the last 12 months. A number of approaches have been adopted by the WPU to communicate understanding of witness protection issues across the force. These include presentations to all senior detectives and a force conference aimed at DIs. Feedback confirmed that the unit has been very proactive in this regard and that the staff within the force who need to understand the procedures are aware or conversant with them.

Work in progress – N/A

Area(s) for improvement

- Demand for the service offered by the WPU is low. There have been a small number of referrals to the unit from across the force area since April 2006. Current arrangements are such that if a division wishes to place a vulnerable witness on the scheme, all associated costs fall to that division. As such, costs can be very high, particularly when budgets are limited. HMI has concerns that individual officers may be pressurised to make risk-based decisions purely on financial grounds. HMI urges the force to consider whether the funding of referrals to the WPU should be a crime management branch responsibility, in effect creating a force-level budget head. Such an arrangement would reduce the risk to the force if a potentially vulnerable witness, under existing protocol, was denied protection and was harmed.
- A conflict also exists for divisional SMTs when a witness not deemed to fall within the definition of one requiring protection is nevertheless assessed as vulnerable. The division must then determine what options are available to minimise the threat before deciding on a specific course of action. Again, these arrangements must be funded locally and currently there is no co-ordination from the centre. The force should satisfy itself that this approach is appropriate given the potential for corporate risk.
- There are regional workshops where witness protection issues are raised but regional collaboration has not, to date, been progressed. Recent regional research presented to Chief Constables has identified opportunities for collaboration in this area and HMI considers that this would be worthy of further development.

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The force has a limited system to monitor the impact of preventive and enforcement activity. At the time of the inspection, there is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- All MIT staff attended a seminar during 2007 to consider the diversity issues that major crime enquiries have on communities.
- The MIT SIOs interviewed during the fieldwork confirmed their awareness and willingness to involve neighbourhood police personnel (police officers and police community support officers (PCSOs)) together with staff from partner agencies, such as local authority wardens, in their investigations into major crime. Indeed, an example was cited where a neighbourhood officer, utilising his local knowledge, was able to identify a small list of possible suspects for a major crime. This resulted in the arrest of a suspect and the rapid detection of the offence.

Work in progress

- There is active development under the guise of the neighbourhood policing framework to develop indicators suitable for this area of business. These will include surveys to neighbourhood level to assess the fear of crime, among other issues. They could be adapted and extended to address major crime issues as well.
- A strategic group, chaired by the ACC (OS), has been established to explore ways to integrate serious and organised crime (including major crime) and counter-terrorism with neighbourhood policing. This addresses issues such as intelligence, tasking and the integration of neighbourhood staff, including PCSOs, with the serious and organised crime agenda.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force acknowledges that it has not yet mapped all of its communities, which is an integral and ongoing aspect of the development of its neighbourhood policing agenda. Until such time as this work has been completed, it is difficult to assess the impact that its preventive and enforcement activity within the area of major crime is having on particularly vulnerable communities. The force should prioritise the development of suitable indicators to assess the harm imposed by major crime once communities have been mapped.

Enforcement

The inspection found evidence that the force sometimes considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a developing security policy to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- The force has a robust approach to IT system integrity in place with access levels utilised to safeguard intelligence and to ensure that only staff with the highest level of access can view the most sensitive intelligence. The force has a reputation for being very risk averse in terms of IT security, with a plethora of security policies and protocols in place.
- There is a very active information compliance unit and an information security officer who work together to ensure that force directives on information security are applied and complied with.
- Regular bi-monthly meetings take place between the ISB and the PSD to assess risk and to protect the intelligence contained within force systems.
- The force is working towards full vetting of all staff in MIT and MCU. SIOs and heads of the units have a good working relationship with PSD and, should the need arise, will not hesitate to take strong action regarding information or intelligence leakage.

Work in progress

- Although the risk-based involvement of the PSD in anti-corruption activity, through its recently introduced integrity unit, is viewed as embryonic, there are many areas that are well integrated into force processes, eg IT security.
- The force has demonstrated its understanding of the issues surrounding the need to maintain the integrity and security of its intelligence systems and processes by embarking on a rolling programme of vetting to cover all MIT staff, with appropriate staff being management vetted. Some members of the MITs are vetted to domestic violence and serious crime level to allow them to work alongside special branch and the counter-terrorism unit. Vetting is also being conducted in relation to some members of the Police Authority and is being considered for all.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although force IT systems have audit trails available in most areas, which are supported by security documentation, there are some gaps. The force needs to satisfy itself that none of the existing gaps are in particularly sensitive or critical areas. Ideally, it should work towards a position where all its IT systems are capable of audit trail interrogation to ensure that users can be identified readily with a view to eliminating unnecessary or inappropriate access.

Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are partially effective, with inadequate use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command groups.

Strengths

- The ACPO lead for major crime sits within the portfolio of the ACC (OS). The Chief Constable takes a close personal interest in the operational performance of the MIT.
- The MIT has a 100% detection rate for all the homicide investigations it has conducted since its inception in April 2005. All of these crimes were detected in less than seven days.
- The chair and vice-chair of the Police Authority, both of whom are vetted, are briefed personally by the head of crime management branch on major crime and sensitive matters every two months. In addition, the five members of the Police Authority who form the protective services committee are also briefed regularly on force and regional matters of interest. These arrangements afford a good level of knowledge and understanding on a range of issues that could impact upon the force, eg the recommendations contained within a report into closer collaboration between the four forces within the sub-region (three Yorkshire forces and Humberside).
- ACPO officers acknowledge the value of briefing the Police Authority regularly, particularly from the perspective of building trust, developing support and its ability to bring a different perspective. In addition, as the Police Authority handles a significant amount of media interest in the activities of the force, briefing representatives of the Authority ensures that messages are communicated consistently.
- Members of the Police Authority have participated directly in gold and silver groups for the management of critical incidents (civil emergencies and major crime). Lessons were learned from the flooding incidents in Hull, which were transferred into the management of a major crime that occurred in Goole. Examples include IT support for joint working with partners and the need for specialist IT support on site to deal directly and speedily with IT issues.

Work in progress

- The force has an IAG structure at both force and BCU levels. Although it has instigated gold command groups to oversee the management of major incidents (such as the police shooting on the A63 trunk road), to date it has not involved the representatives of IAG within these gold groups. The force has acknowledged this fact but accepts that if the need arose and the circumstances warranted it, then members of the IAG could be utilised as part of a gold group.

Area(s) for improvement

- ACPO best practice recommends community membership on gold groups as well as IAG members, particularly in high-profile cases. This is an area the force should explore to identify best practice from other UK forces that is appropriate for the policing context in Humberside.

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The ACPO lead and the head of the crime management branch are fully trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime and critical incidents. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone adequate training and testing in critical incident command, community impact assessments and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- The force's two incumbent ACCs are both trained in linked and series crime and SCIMITAR (the management of large-scale public disorder). Neither of these officers is from a crime management background and the value of this training was acknowledged in terms of their ability to carry out their responsibilities (see AFI). The head of crime management branch is an experienced SIO with many years' experience and has all the necessary training for the position held.
- During December 2007, the ACCs have been involved in training exercises, provided by SOCA, covering kidnap and extortion. They have also been active participants in counter-terrorism exercises during 2007 relating to hostage taking and incidents at key locations.
- Although the force has not yet found itself in the position of having to appoint an ACPO lead in terms of an officer in overall command (OIOC) of a linked or series crime occurrence extending either regionally or nationally, it has a process in place to make such an appointment if required. Confidence was expressed that, should the need arise, particularly within the region, an OIOC would be appointed promptly.
- The force operates with community cohesion officers within each of its four operational BCUs. These officers are called upon routinely to advise both the SIO and ACPO officers on the potential impact of a major crime on the community and to assist in the development of tactical options that will reduce or eliminate tension. All SIOs trained to PIP level 3 will have knowledge of community impact assessments and the head of crime management branch is in a position to advise the ACPO leads should this be required. Divisional commanders and the new head of community safety are able to offer advice regarding policing in partnership.

Work in progress – N/A

Area(s) for improvement

- The two ACCs are both trained in linked/series crime and large-scale public order. Concern was expressed about the current lack of a gold level training programme for ACPO officers in counter-terrorism at the national level. Although it is believed there are sufficient ACPO officers within the region to service demand, their identity is not apparently recorded in a co-ordinated manner, either regionally or nationally. These gaps were highlighted by the ACCs interviewed during the fieldwork and supported by the chair of the Police Authority. HMI acknowledges that these gaps are national, as opposed to force and/or regional, issues and need to be acknowledged and addressed at that level.

The force's performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of outcomes, costs, inputs and outputs.

Strengths

- The head of crime management branch has regular meetings with the head of the MIT to assess the current investigations and make a judgement against determined outcomes. There is an effective process to wind down investigations should the need arise.
- All MIT investigations are debriefed to identify learning opportunities. Lessons learned are then fed back to the wider organisation via a variety of forums, including a four-weekly briefing of SIOs and presentations to the force's senior detectives meeting.
- Working through the finance manager within the crime management branch, all MIT investigations are provisionally costed at the start of the inquiry and a budget is set. Where an investigation appears to have the potential to run for a lengthy period of time, a finance officer is appointed within the team to monitor ongoing cost, so that the SIO is continuously aware of the financial status of the investigation and can make informed strategic/tactical decisions accordingly.
- Since the inception of the MIT in 2005, the average cost of each investigation handled by the team has dropped from £13,299 (2004/05) to £11,293 (2006/07). These savings have been achieved by reducing overtime, changing shift patterns, staff working flexibly, targeting forensic requirements, shorter incidents resulting from the time of the offence to the arrest of suspects and maximising golden hour opportunities.
- By utilising opportunities to convert police officer posts within the MIT to provision by police staff, under workforce modernisation criteria, savings have been made particularly within the context of the inside personnel who staff MIRs. For example, the conversion of the officer manager role reduced costs by £24,493 per post (three posts) and that of indexers saved £12,280 per post (seven posts). Significant savings were also achieved in respect of other posts such as exhibits/disclosure officers and index supervisors (see AFI).

Work in progress

- The ongoing process of debriefing all MIT investigations has resulted in a substantial rise in the number of automatically generated HOLMES actions that are instigated at the beginning of an investigation.
- The force is embarking on a process of workforce modernisation resulting in police posts being converted to civilian investigators, notably CCTV and telephone enquiries on major incident investigations.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although the MIT has a succession plan for its staff and has successfully applied workforce modernisation criteria to the personnel within its MIR structure, it now needs to assess the opportunities available to convert some of its investigator posts from police officer provision to that of delivery by police staff.

Performance Management and Resilience

The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; however, collaborative agreements with SOCA and regional forces exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage HR provide partial protection for the investigative capability.

Strengths

- The force MIT comprises a range of staff under the command of a highly experienced SIO at detective superintendent rank. In addition, there are a number of SIOs at detective chief inspector rank. The team has 'inside' personnel who staff the MIR and investigators, including trainee detectives. The inside staff are trained and can provide all key MIR specialist roles, including office managers, indexers, exhibit/disclosure personnel, etc. The vast majority of the 'outside' investigators are very experienced detectives (ICIPD qualified or part qualified), who have been selected for their proven track record. Turnover within the team is limited with staff fully committed to their role. A succession plan is in place for all posts within the team.
- The MIT has ready access to five fully equipped MIRs across the force area. The equipment available within these facilities is described as being fully fit for purpose with the majority of these rooms having recently been upgraded/refurbished.
- All of the force's SIOs are trained to PIP level 3. Currently the MIT has one tier 5 interview adviser, with a second working towards this qualification. The service provided by the qualified adviser was described by the SIOs interviewed as being highly professional.
- The force operates with a night-shift DI, who is notified of major crime occurrences and who makes the decision whether to call out the MIT and the on-call SIO. Feedback from SIOs universally confirmed the value of these arrangements, with all the critically important initial steps (during the golden hour) having been implemented prior to their arrival at the scene and the MIT team having been assembled quickly to facilitate a rapid response to the investigation.
- Force policy is that all homicides within force, inclusive of category C (detected domestic murders), are the responsibility of the MIT. Feedback from senior BCU staff confirmed the value of this arrangement, which means their staff are rarely, if at all, abstracted to support the MIT. Working relationships between the MIT and the BCUs are described as excellent, with the MIT senior managers being prepared to manage their staff flexibly to assist the BCUs with large or serious crime investigations that stretch local resources.
- The MIT will take on the investigation of linked or series rapes and utilise trained staff to both interview and investigate, as well as utilising one of the predefined rape suites located within the force boundary. Individual rape investigations will be undertaken by the relevant division.
- Force policy also dictates that the MIT leads for the organisation in matters where corporate manslaughter may be present. A case was cited where the MIT had worked with the Maritime Accident Investigation Branch on an investigation involving

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two deaths on board a ship. In addition, the MIT works closely with the Health and Safety Executive when accidents occur on commercial premises. It also has responsibility for the investigation of unexpected or suspicious deaths in care homes.

- Strong and effective working relationships were confirmed with key partner agencies in the investigation of major crime, such as Home Office pathologists (force policy being that they always attend the scene as well as conduct the post-mortem examination) and the forensic science service.
- The MIT SIOs work closely with the CPS to consider the strategy for an investigation and its possible impact on decision-making processes when potential charges are being considered. The CPS is involved in the process early and working relationships between the agencies are described as open and effective.
- The TSU has both the capacity and capability to deal with a wide range of specialist activity, including crime scene investigation, forensics, high-tech crime, 3D imaging and body mapping. HMI considers it is a very effective and impressive unit, especially given the size of the force, delivering effective support for the force and in particular the investigation of major crime and homicide.
- Representatives from SOCA are present at the level 2 tasking and co-ordination meeting. There are effective linkages with the force and examples of collaboration were evident.

Work in progress – N/A

Area(s) for improvement

- Although the force has a range of specialist assets, it is clear that without regional support it would struggle to sustain a response to a kidnap offence for more than 12 hours. Although confidence was expressed that such support would be forthcoming, either from regional forces or from SOCA, no evidence was adduced to confirm these arrangements in the form of a written protocol or memorandum of understanding. The force should work with partners to develop such a document.
- Although only positive feedback was received from SIOs about the initial response to major crime by both the force control room personnel and front-line operational staff, discussions with control room personnel confirmed that very few have been trained or have experienced a 'tiger kidnap' offence and would therefore have to rely on instinct to infer, from information communicated to them, that such an offence may be occurring. The control room undertakes regular training days and the force is urged to ensure that call-taking staff are trained in the recognition of potential tiger kidnap offences.

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Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through an infrastructure that is proven to be effective. Regional support is available through verbal collaborative agreements, which are sound. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a range of major crime offences.

Strengths

- The head of the MIT confirmed that there are no issues of significance in terms of his ability to access and obtain a broad range of specialist skills to facilitate the effective investigation of major crime on demand. Furthermore, he confirmed that the vast majority of these specialist skills, eg surveillance, economic crime investigators, family liaison officers (FLOs) etc, are all available within the wider structure of the force. He expressed confidence that if the need ever arose where specialist resources were not deliverable internally, regional arrangements are such that assistance could be obtained at short notice, although it was unclear whether these arrangements were formalised or through personal contact. (If the latter, then scope exists for the force to formalise arrangements through discussions and written agreement with partner forces.)
- The MCU services the force's response to serious and organised crime. It comprises four main sections under the command of a detective chief inspector. These units include a crime support section (full-time surveillance team), a serious crime section, that focuses its activities on OCGs (part-time surveillance capability) and an economic crime section that deals with complex fraud investigations, money laundering offences, cash seizures and asset confiscation. Sub-branches of this section include an HTCUC (computer crime), an internet sex offenders unit (CEOP investigations) and a special operations section that can provide test purchase and undercover operations. All of these services are theoretically available to the wider force, including the MIT, to support major crime and level 2 operations.
- The force has an effective FLO structure to support major crime investigation. Force policy is such that once deployed FLOs become an integral part of the investigation team and they are deployed in pairs (with a less experienced officer working in tandem with an experienced colleague). The FLCs are trained to national standards, with four having completed the management of serious crime course. All FLOs are trained to PIP level 2 (via the ICIDP route). The force FLO co-ordinator, at DI level, represents the force regionally at FLO forums and has established links with the national FLO adviser. Feedback from SIOs confirmed their satisfaction with FLO arrangements and the resilience of the structure.
- The force scientific support manager is a former SIO. His staff work closely with the MIT SIOs to ensure that forensic science resources support investigations by delivering a comprehensive, professional service. Feedback from the SIOs interviewed confirmed their satisfaction with the service being provided to them by the scientific support manager and his staff.
- The force operates with a level 2 DSU, which also acts as a part-time WPU (see MC15). Although the DSU and WPU are capable of being tasked to support the work of the MIT, this has so far never arisen in any of the major investigations undertaken by the MIT. The SIOs interviewed did, however, express their confidence that if there was a need, these services would be made available to them on demand.

Work in progress – N/A

Area(s) for improvement – N/A

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The force has an on-demand independent case review team that is generally deployed when current and historic major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is efficient. (Refers to impact on cases.)

Strengths

- The 100% detection rate for all homicide investigations conducted by the MIT since its inception in April 2005, with all detected within seven days, has minimised the need to conduct a formal review of the investigation at 7, 14 and 28-day intervals per MIRSAP/MIM requirements. However, arrangements are in place to conduct any requisite reviews, utilising independent SIOs who work outside the MIT structure, when the need arises.
- The force has a small number of undetected homicides dating back to the 1970s (now less than ten) and these are kept under constant review by the SIOs within the MIT. The application of this policy has recently resulted in the extradition, trial and conviction of a suspect from Australia for an outstanding cold case murder.
- Although detected in less than seven days, a complex 'no body' murder investigation required extensive searches over several weeks to locate the victim. The force utilised the services of an independent former SIO, employed by Dream Policing, to review and ratify the search strategy employed by the SIO in the case.

Work in progress

- An historic cold case involving a child murder, where low copy number (LCN) DNA evidence has recently been secured, is now pending' following the outcome of the Omagh bomb trial judgment. Once the implications of the judgment have been resolved, the investigation will be progressed by the SIO.
- The force considers that it has not had to manage a category A+ homicide investigation that has reached the point of requiring independent review. It does recognise that some of the homicides that it has investigated could fall into this enhanced category because of their implications for community tension/confidence/media interest. Established linkages with other forces and SIOs in the region are developed to the point where the services of a wholly independent SIO to review any sensitive investigation could be secured, should the need arise.

Area(s) for improvement – N/A

The inspection found that the force was predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the MIM and MIRSAP.

Strengths

- As indicated in MC20, the two ACCs within the force who could potentially be called upon to assist the force's SIOs are both trained in the areas of linked and series crime and large-scale public order. Although the majority of the SIOs interviewed confirmed that they had not been placed in a position where they had needed to seek such ACPO assistance, confirmation was received from the head of the MIT that one of the ACCs had actively supported him by securing specialist external resources in a complex 'no body' homicide investigation.
- Force policy requires the commissioning and ongoing completion of a policy book, by the SIO, in all major crime investigations (per MIRSAP and MIM requirements). This includes the rationale and decision-making process adopted by the SIO not to pursue specific lines of enquiry during the course of an investigation, as well as the creation of separate policy logs explaining the processes applied to sensitive issues/decision making.
- The force operates with a highly regarded, self-contained crash and collision investigation unit, which is staffed by very experienced and highly trained specialist investigators. The services of this unit are used routinely to review/conduct investigations into fail to stop crashes and collisions, particularly those where there is the potential for the incident to result in a fatality. This unit can call upon the MIT for specialist support where necessary.

Work in progress

- The force considers that the only area of compliance with MIRSAP where it may be vulnerable relates to the downloading of intelligence from HOLMES to the crime intelligence system (CIS). To overcome this vulnerability, all MIT staff have a PDR directive to populate CIS with transferable intelligence. Quantifiable compliance is monitored by supervisors in terms of the numbers of intelligence logs staff transfer.

Area(s) for improvement – N/A

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

HMI acknowledges the work undertaken at the strategic level to address risk and ensure it is mitigated, but this is not replicated at divisional or branch level in a formalised manner. HMI therefore recommends that the force should develop a risk register at each level appropriate to their area of business.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
AFI	area for improvement
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition
AVR	armed vehicle response

B

BCU	basic command unit
BIA	Border and Immigration Agency

C

CDRP	crime and disorder reduction partnership
CEOP	Child Exploitation and Online Protection
CHIS	covert human intelligence source
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service

D

DAT	drug action team
DC	detective constable
DCC	deputy chief constable
DI	detective inspector
DIB	divisional intelligence bureau
DS	detective sergeant
DSU	dedicated support unit
DWP	Department for Work and Pensions

F

FDO	force duty officer
FI	financial investigator
FIB	force intelligence bureau
FIU	force intelligence unit
FLC	family liaison co-ordinator
FLO	family liaison officer
FSA	force strategic assessment

H

HMI	Her Majesty's Inspector
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HMRC	Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
HR	human resources
HTCU	high-tech crime unit

I

IAG	independent advisory group
ICIDP	Initial Crime Investigators Development Programme
ISB	information services branch
IT	information technology

J

JSIA	joint strategic intelligence assessment
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K

KIN	key individual network
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L

LSP	local strategic partnership
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M

MAPPA	multi-agency public protection arrangements
MARAC	multi-agency risk assessment conference
MCU	major crime unit
MIM	murder investigation manual
MIR	major incident room
MIRSAP	major incident room standardised administrative procedures
MIT	major incident team
MoPI	management of police information
MSF	most similar force(s)

N

NIM	National Intelligence Model
NPIA	National Police Improvement Agency
NPSAT	National Protective Services Analysis Tool
NSPIS	National Strategy for Police Information Systems

O

OCG	organised crime group
OIOC	officer in overall command
OS	operational support

P

PA	Police Act 1997
PCSO	police community support officer
PDR	performance development review
PIP	professionalising the investigative process
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
PSD	public service department

R

RART	regional asset recovery team
RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
RIU	regional intelligence unit

S

SCAS	serious crime analysis section
SGC	specific grading criteria
SIO	senior investigating officer
SMT	senior management team
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SPI	statutory performance indicator

T

TCG	tasking and co-ordination group
TSU	technical support unit

W

WPU	witness protection unit
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