



HMIC INSPECTION

PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT

HUMBERSIDE POLICE

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PART ONE - INTRODUCTION

PREFACE

1.1 Humberside Police has been in engagement with the Police Standards Unit (PSU) since October 2003 and has remained in the fourth quartile of forces in HMIC baseline assessments during the same period.

1.2 This inspection was conducted at the invitation of the Chief Constable, Mr Tim Hollis, QPM, following the 2006 police performance assessment framework (PPAF) results and HMIC baseline scores which placed Humberside joint bottom when compared to all other forces. In post for some 18 months, the Chief Constable sought objective views on areas for improvement to supplement those identified during the last baseline process in 2006. The inspection was carried out by Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary, Mr Ken Williams, CVO, CBE, QPM, BA between November and December 2006.

SCOPE

1.3 The inspection focused on the processes, systems and enablers that are essential for the delivery of effective performance improvement including corporate governance, partnerships, performance management, human resources, finance and strategic issues. As part of the overall approach and cognisant of its role, Humberside Police Authority agreed for HMI to review aspects of its governance arrangements and a separate management report has been prepared for the Authority.

1.4 It was stressed from the outset that the inspection was not a precursor to intervention or a formal part of the engagement process. It was an opportunity for an independent, in depth assessment to be made in key areas that would assist the force to make sustainable performance improvements in the long term.

BACKGROUND

Force Area

1.5 Humberside Police covers the counties of North East Lincolnshire, North Lincolnshire and the East Riding of Yorkshire along with the urban area of Kingston-upon-Hull. This total area of 1,356 square miles centres on the Humber Estuary, serving a population of almost 900,000 residents. The number of people served by Humberside Police increases significantly when considering those visiting the area through tourism and travel. It is estimated that one million people a year travel to and from Europe by ferry via Kingston-upon-Hull and a further 250,000 people on domestic and international flights from Humberside Airport. The area maintains its strong maritime heritage with the Humber ports of Immingham, Grimsby, Goole and Hull accounting for over 15% of the UK overseas trade, and handling more trade with the rest of Europe than any other British port.

1.6 The principal conurbations are Kingston-upon-Hull, Grimsby, and Scunthorpe. The black and minority ethnic (BME) communities in the area were historically concentrated mainly in Kingston-upon-Hull and Scunthorpe with Chinese, Bangladeshi and Indian being the most populated. However, this has changed significantly with the arrival of communities from Eastern European states and has diversified the population mix in Humberside. There has been a concentration of these communities in all four divisions of Humberside but in particular Goole has seen the highest numbers settle. The region continues to support the dispersal of asylum seekers to Humberside, particularly into Hull and Grimsby.

Strategic Priorities

1.7 The force identified four strategic priorities to inform action and development throughout 2006/07 and these are:

Priority one - incident handling: To improve the way in which calls from the public are handled to ensure they receive a prompt response and are dealt with effectively.

Priority two - volume crime: To implement a system for investigating crime that ensures, when evidence exists, the offender is identified and dealt with promptly.

Priority three - neighbourhood policing: To provide dedicated, visible, accessible and responsive policing teams to all neighbourhoods in the Humberside policing area.

Priority four - dealing with anti-social behaviour (ASB) and nuisance: To increase pride and respect within neighbourhoods by dealing effectively with ASB, criminal damage and other incidents that make communities feel unsafe.

PERFORMANCE (The most current data available is presented in Appendix 1)

1.8 The force is structured around three 'pillars' of volume crime, response and neighbourhood, with this model replicated in all four basic command units (BCUs). A corporate performance management framework is in place and has recently been extended to unit and team level. Despite gradual improvements in performance over recent years it is only in the last quarter of 2006 that more marked improvements in some areas have been achieved and the force has managed to shift its position in relation to its peers.

1.9 Improvements seen recently, most notably sanction detections, have been as a result of a sustained drive on this issue at all levels of the organisation, greater co-ordination of effort across all disciplines driven through Operation Pegasus, the embedding of changes such as the volume crime model and improved training in key operational issues, eg issuing of fixed penalty notices (FPNs) for crime, interviewing for offences taken in to consideration (TICs). Reductions in crime have been most noticeable in vehicle crime but not as marked in other offences and indeed in some areas, eg violent crime and robbery, they have actually increased over the period – comment will be made on this later in the report.

1.10 There have been improvements in other areas of performance notably call handling where attendance times, call waiting times and the queue of outstanding

logs awaiting a response has improved markedly and HMI is pleased to acknowledge these improvements. They are currently ranked 2nd in their MSF group for the percentage of 999 calls answered within the target of 10 seconds.

1.11 Customer service satisfaction levels also improved during 2006 most notably in relation to keeping people informed of progress and overall satisfaction with the service provided, lifting the force up the MSF rankings (see appendix 1).

1.12 Improvements in most crime categories over time are apparent when examining the data but the dilemma faced by the force is that other forces in the MSF are also achieving improvements and as a result the force has to work significantly harder to close the gap. This makes it vitally important to address any strategic or corporate issues that are impacting on delivery as a matter of urgency in order that a sustainable long-term improvement in performance can be achieved.

METHODOLOGY

1.13 The groundwork for the inspection was carried out in November 2006 by staff officers and specialists from HMIC accompanied by Dr Peter Langmead-Jones (Lancashire Constabulary) who provided an independent overview of performance management. The data was gathered from a series of interviews with both key internal staff and external partners and agencies, focus groups with staff of varying ranks, available force documentation and systems and national iQuanta data sources which was then analysed and assessed against the following frameworks:

- Volume Crime – Investigation and Reduction
- Neighbourhood Policing
- Incident Handling and Demand Management.

1.14 The underpinning issues identified were then triangulated with specialist inspections around human resources and finance to gauge the sustainability of the current performance drive and whether the organisation, as a whole, was delivering to best effect. These findings, together with current and historic data, formed the subject of subsequent interviews with lead officers and other stakeholders. The consistent focus throughout was on delivering improvement in current levels of performance.

PART TWO - DELIVERY

VOLUME CRIME REDUCTION

2.1 Volume crime reduction during 2006, apart from vehicle crime which has seen a 13.3% reduction for the calendar year 2006 when compared to 2005, has not been as significant as anticipated and certainly insufficient to significantly impact on the overall MSF position. It has been acknowledged by senior staff that the focus in recent months has been totally directed towards improvement in sanction detections, which saw a step change in performance during October and November 2006 from an average total sanction detection rate in the region of 20% to one over 30%. If sustained, this will significantly improve the prospects of the force impacting on its MSF comparison.

2.2 It has been argued that some increases in crime are due to calls being handled more efficiently with more people getting through to the police and not hanging up. Some increase has been due to a concentration on sanction detections for crimes such as cannabis possession and the increased use of FPNs, but there is also a high 'no crime' rate (up to 10% and more for some categories of crime) that indicates problems with initial crime recording (the force has reduced this figure since the inspection).

2.3 There will inevitably be a number of no crime reports, for a variety of reasons, however the level seen in Humberside is symptomatic of a systemic problem that needs correction at the most effective point in the process, namely initial crime recording. Staff in the customer service crime centre (CSCC) need to be trained effectively in the initial assessment of crime and there needs to be an effective quality assurance process as currently there is no systemised internal auditing being undertaken.

2.4 Excessive 'no crime' reports represent an inefficient use of staff time and it was noted that a number of additional workstreams had been established in divisions to rectify a corporate problem. The issue has been identified by the force and it is seeking to find a resolution but the work and implementation of a solution needs expediting.

HMI suggests that: The force implements a solution to the crime recording problems at the earliest opportunity.

2.5 There is a lack of due focus being given to crime reduction in the performance framework at a strategic level. Attendance at divisional briefings and national intelligence model (NIM) based T&CG processes reveals a similar lack of focus. Interviews with partners revealed a mixture of conflicting viewpoints, with some praising individual approaches to crime reduction and others commenting on the debilitating effect (from their perspective) of the current drive on sanction detections by the force.

2.6 There is an acknowledgement that sustainable crime reduction is predicated on effective partnership working and investment and there were some very good examples of local relationships and initiatives, which were taking the crime reduction agenda forward. However, in the absence of a current force-wide crime reduction strategy, partnership activity lacks direction, co-ordination and is subject to variation in effectiveness across the force.

2.7 There is little evidence that the force has the capability to identify and understand what works in the field of crime reduction. In corporate development, work is driven by the disengagement agenda and in the absence of a community safety branch the head of partnerships suffers from an under investment in staff and a lack of clear direction whilst servicing a wide portfolio, including the neighbourhood policing agenda. The inevitable result is that this area of work is not effectively undertaken.

2.8 In many forces resources allow for a level 2 commitment to force-wide crime reduction. HMI accepts that to create such a unit in Humberside would effectively strip out any proactive capability in divisions. However those corporate resources that do exist such as the roads crime section, ARVs and major incident teams need to be effectively utilised in tackling volume crime issues that impact on divisions. There is evidence of these units being utilised recently in certain divisions and this is to be encouraged. Resources allocated should be on the basis of need and units deployed as a result of a bidding process to maximise the impact on performance.

PARTNERSHIPS

2.9 Partnership working can result in sustainable crime reduction but it is essential there are effective corporate policies to promote joint working, provide direction and remove blockages. Some senior staff viewed partnership working as being a divisional issue and the benefits of a more corporate joined up approach to crime reduction across Humberside were not fully appreciated. There was good evidence of effective partnership working at a local level with joint tasking which, whilst embryonic, is developing and leading to some effective joint problem solving.

2.10 There are good links locally between chief executives or senior members of the local authorities and the divisional commanders with evidence of the latter being involved in a number of key meetings and processes. However, commanders should not forget the importance of communication with elected members. Communication through both formal and informal contacts is a key role for divisional commanders and this must include all elected representatives.

2.11 Meetings between the chief executives and the Chief Constable are currently on an 'ad hoc' basis and these are the only formalised contacts with the chief officer group (COG), although there is a willingness on the part of the local authorities to formalise these to every quarter or bimonthly. This would provide a forum for clear explanation of policy decisions that impact across Humberside, eg police community support officers (PCSOs), drive on sanction detections, movement of staff etc, as well as addressing pan Humberside issues such as regeneration, investment, citizen focus and joint working. There were signs of relationships developing, one example being the development of the force-wide safer homes initiative led by the deputy chief constable (DCC). During 2006, at the initiative of the Chief Constable, a series of meetings were held with the full council in each of the four unitary authorities. These were received particularly well and is a sign of an improving relationship.

HMI suggests that: The force builds on the good local links between BCUs and partners by formalising a strategic meeting between the Chief Constable and the chief executives and other key partners.

2.12 The developing role of the superintendent (partnerships) in Hull was seen to be good practice and now beginning to yield real value, with good examples of co-ordinated activities with the local authority beginning to emerge. However, the funding for this post is under review and HMI would urge the force not to overlook the value of this role when decisions are made on its future.

2.13 There is little evidence of a clear corporate direction being provided to divisions to identify what was required from them in relation to partnership working. Relationships and activity is developing on a local level in each division but without a real impetus from HQ in relation to the benefits of effective partnership working for long term sustainable crime reduction. Despite extensive efforts by the force there is no apparent willingness or capacity from partners to invest in developing a 'Humberside-wide approach' on volume crime matters, nor in actively co-ordinating protocols around partnership data sharing and management. A number of different local protocols are in place, but there is no corporate direction for data sharing. It would benefit the force if a renewed attempt was made to address this issue as part of the overall approach to partnership working.

2.14 There is an understanding on the part of partners in relation to the pressures to deliver performance however some believe this is at the expense of longer term crime reduction, local problem solving and the achievement of PSA1 targets.

2.15 The force GIS system and the local authorities' geographic mapping systems are not compatible and this causes inefficiencies and workstreams have to be developed to overcome the problem. A pan Humberside or sub regional data observatory has been muted by one local authority but not taken up across Humberside.

HMI suggests that: The force ensures compatibility between the force data systems and key partners to enable data sharing to be more effective and efficient. Consideration could be given to supporting the creation of a pan Humberside or sub regional 'data observatory'.

2.16 A community safety branch would be the natural home for corporate partnership issues and crime reduction policies. The head of partnerships currently has these responsibilities while also driving the neighbourhood policing agenda which will assume greater importance given the Government's focus on this area of work. This unit suffers from a lack of clear direction and resources. HMI is concerned that, as currently configured, the force will be unable to deliver on these key business areas.

RECOMMENDATION 1

The force should invest in an adequately resourced community safety branch which should develop and oversee a comprehensive crime reduction strategy that takes due cognisance of the role of partner agencies and the importance of understanding tried and tested methods of reducing crime.

VOLUME CRIME INVESTIGATION

2.17 The force has gradually improved the overall sanction detection rate during the period April 2006 to December 2006 with the most noticeable improvement in the third quarter. It is now on course for a rolling 12 month total by March 2007 that will exceed the disengagement target of 23% and which is more in line with peers in the MSF group. This improvement has come about due to a vigorous focus on the enablers including an increased use of FPNs, a greater number of TICs and a greater use of formal warnings for possession of cannabis. There has also been a tightening up of processes and procedures to ensure that all detections are captured more effectively on force systems.

2.18 It was apparent during the course of the inspection that the prioritised focus on sanction detections has had the effect of skewing activity in other business areas, notably neighbourhood policing (NP) and specialist operations. There is little focus on crime reduction and this is reflected in corporate performance challenges such as the DCC's monthly performance meeting (this will be addressed later in the report).

2.19 Neighbourhood police officers are concerned at being given the same sanction detection targets as other teams, given that they see their role as reassurance and longer term problem solving. It is acknowledged these officers should not be immune to the need to detect crime but there is a danger and some evidence that activity is being skewed away from their main role. This is replicated with officers in roads policing sections and armed response vehicles where there is anecdotal evidence that they are achieving their sanction detection targets by focusing on areas outside their core business, eg, arresting shoplifters or cautioning youths for possession of cannabis.

2.20 The force restructured its resources to match the three pillars of volume crime, NP and response during 2005. The volume crime model (VCM) was then introduced in April 2006, with the encouragement of the PSU. The VCM is bedding down well in Hull but other divisions find it more difficult because of the number of staff required for the model to be effective. The introduction of the VCM was another major change within a relatively short period of time and whilst it is acknowledged that some aspects require time to embed themselves, a number of issues caused concern during the inspection.

2.21 There had been an under investment in investigative training for a number of years and the introduction of the MIT and volume crime teams (VCTs) within a relatively short time period brought this into sharp focus. Officers themselves identified a lack of relevant experience and expertise in the VCT. Many experienced staff had been moved to the MIT leaving a dearth of skills within the division and very few officers who could act as mentors. This was raised during the baseline inspection in 2006 and HMI is pleased to note that the force have taken steps to rectify the problem by doubling investigative training courses, this action was driven as part of operation Pegasus.

2.22 There appears to be a lack of experience and skills amongst very junior operational supervisors who are unable to advise on relatively complex issues, which are now being dealt with by the VCT. The relatively high number of acting ranks at sergeant level is also identified as a further inhibitor to effectiveness in this area.

2.23 The use of the NIM and briefings is a mixed package across the force with some divisions better at using these tools than others. The force relies heavily on an electronic briefing and tasking system (BATS). Whilst there is evidence of self-briefing from the system, the tasking element is consistently under-utilised. Coupled with the developing nature of performance frameworks within the force, much effort remained self-led rather than focused. Amongst staff interviewed HMI is concerned to note the lack of appreciation and understanding of the importance of focusing on prolific and priority offenders (PPOs) coupled with a lack of their appearance in some intelligence bulletins.

2.24 Visits to tasking and co-ordinating group (TCG) meetings revealed that there is much progress to make in this area despite variations between divisions. In the main, it needs to be better developed so that officers are clearly directed and accountable for delivery of key tasks. That said, some good practice is evident in D Division, which could provide the next steps for the force.

2.25 The linkage with level 2 tasking is less obvious and resources at level 2 are often obtained outside the structured tasking process via personal contact. Volume crime does not appear as a priority in the force control strategy, although this has been acknowledged and will be rectified.

2.26 Performance around forensic management is also variable but improving noticeably, with different levels of approach to the processing of 'forensic hits'. A force 'converter' team stands out as working well. The force is showing better performance lately on iQuanta data but initial scene investigation remains an area for further development, with variable levels of awareness of its contribution to performance shown by operational officers.

2.27 The use of FPNs to obtain sanction detections has clearly expanded and there was an examination of the systems surrounding their usage to ensure compliance with the guidelines. Anecdotal evidence from officers identified that blockages in custody and the inordinate delays in consulting the evidence review officers (EROs) and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) were resulting in tickets being issued for public order offences when the detainees had been arrested for assault.

2.28 The short-term focus on producing sanction detections is also leading to inappropriate disposals around young people who may have been better served through diversion or partnership support schemes. Final warnings in Humberside are administered on the day the young person is arrested at the police station. This is contrary to Youth Justice Board *Key Elements of Effective Practice* which recommends young people are bailed for an assessment by the youth offending team (YOT) prior to the final warning being administered or other form of disposal being used.

2.29 There is a lack of consistency regarding young persons receiving final warnings, reprimands or being charged. It is apparent that there is no 'gatekeeping' on decisions and the ACPO gravity matrix is not being used by staff.

2.30 Final warnings have increased by 50% in the past two years and clearly this has impacted on capacity to deliver assessments and interventions with young persons. This may in part be due to the drive to increase detections across Humberside. However, there are concerns that young persons are being unnecessarily criminalised when alternative interventions would be more appropriate.

2.31 Further instances were given of a similar lack of consistency in approach to the drugs intervention programme (DIP) where, instead of being guided into treatment, detainees were given FPNs for possession in order to obtain a sanction detection. This is clearly against the principles upon which DIP is promoted.

RECOMMENDATION 2

The force should review the use of fixed penalty notices for crime to ensure they are being used both ethically and appropriately and ensure the correct means of disposal for those young people arrested for crime.

NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING

2.32 Neighbourhood policing (NP) has a long tradition in Humberside, originally built around local policing teams (LPTs) and promoted under the previous Chief Constable. The police authority fully supports the concept and introduced an ambitious estates plan, which delivered purpose-built accommodation in a number of locations across the force area. The Chief Constable has subsequently revised the model giving it equal planning priority with the VCM (investigation and reduction) and response policing.

2.33 There is a tension between resources required for NP and those required to staff the volume crime model. The neighbourhood model in Humberside is heavily predicated on the recruitment of PCSOs and any reduction in funding in this area will adversely impact on the overall success of the initiative. Given the recent history of the force it is unlikely the public would look sympathetically on any lack of delivery in this area which could impact on confidence levels and the overall perception of the force.

2.34 The levels of development and integration of the NP model with partnership working varies across the force. In some areas there are clear signs that resources have been ring-fenced, often at the expense of the volume crime model, that are delivering real benefits in terms of public reassurance, within the wider local authority community regeneration structures.

2.35 There is an acceptance that, as a whole, NP is under resourced, which in turn is resulting in missed opportunities for partnership working and locally based problem solving in support of crime reduction. A culture of citizen focus is essential for all NP staff and this needs embedding in the performance framework from the outset. There are some good examples of joint problem solving and joint tasking at neighbourhood level, although this is not embedded yet throughout the force. The short-term drive on detections is reducing the limited capacity to deal with neighbourhood issues.

2.36 A number of new police stations were introduced within the previous LPT model. They were designed with front counter facilities with the implied promise of attention; this can be a source of frustration for members of the public, as often the counters remain vacant. There was an acknowledgement that the force is trying to rectify this through volunteer support.

2.37 There is anticipation within the force that the employment of additional PCSOs will support NP. Funding has been allocated for the longer term with an aim to have 332 PCSOs by 2008 with another 3 externally funded. At the time of the formal inspection an announcement had been made which limited the national funding for PCSOs. HMI was pleased to note that Humberside had identified resources which could enable them to fulfil their PCSO commitment to neighbourhoods.

2.38 Focus groups of police officers and PCSOs identified some communities now perceiving a lack of response and little priority being given to community based problems. Notwithstanding this, the feedback provided from stakeholders on constables, special constables and PCSOs working in communities was good.

2.39 The force anticipates longer term that NP will be the core business of the force when the issues around volume crime and response have been consolidated. There is a willingness on the part of staff and community members to make it work and the area appears suited to this style of policing. Concerns have been expressed from stakeholders that the overreliance on PCSOs may adversely impact on the success of the project. It is therefore essential at this stage of development that the force evaluate the potential risks to public confidence in its current approach to NP. It should also identify with partners, the wider linkages with recovery, regeneration, crime reduction and overall public perceptions.

2.40 The police authority expressed concerns that the skills and powers of police constables are required, in sufficient numbers, to ensure success in the NP model. Sustainability is also an issue, with the authority believing that resources allocated to this area are currently being used to bolster other areas of business. There is broad agreement that the PCSOs have been trained well and are working effectively, but there is concern regarding their deployment to inappropriate incidents and their overall supervision. The police authority is taking a particular interest in this area and has asked for a number of reports on associated issues.

2.41 The pillars of response, neighbourhoods and investigation have been established with the intention of achieving efficiency and effectiveness from specialisation and organisation specific to these areas within an overarching framework which pulls all of the elements together. There was little evidence of a consistent clear understanding of the need to develop a focus on neighbourhood level benefits and reducing harm or of reliable links with level 2 tasking and resource availability. The NIM is fundamental to this and if these processes do not function well then the structure encourages silo based activity. There is a need for a common framework or philosophy which overarches these arrangements intended to support neighbourhood policing.

2.42 The force needs to be clear about the definition of community intelligence, how it will be collected, analysed and actioned. The introduction of PCSOs is associated with an increase in the throughput of information and additional numbers can be expected to have an even greater impact. Presently, the force does not have the capacity to make NP intelligence led. A business case is being written for further investment in the intelligence processes to support the development of NP.

2.43 The force is working to develop a culture which understands the significance of NP and the need to focus processes and resources on delivering benefits to neighbourhoods in partnership. All of the separate internal elements are in place, as

are relationships with partners; however, an understanding of the level of integration and involvement required, transforming the situation into one where NP and citizen focus is systemic, is an area for development.

RECOMMENDATION 3

The force should ensure that the intelligence systems and associated processes, citizen focused performance management, resource management and the management of risk are effectively developed and co-ordinated to maximise the benefits of neighbourhood policing.

DEMAND MANAGEMENT

2.44 The inspection looked at two aspects of incident handling. Firstly, the initial handling and management of calls for service and, secondly, the ability of the force to respond to them.

Initial Contact

2.45 Call management had been highlighted by the police authority as a key area of concern when the current Chief Constable took up post in April 2005. A project team was created and there has been significant investment in the call handling centres both in terms of staffing, systems and skills development.

2.46 The force has recruited a customer services manager who previously worked in a private sector facility and has introduced new practices into the way staff are monitored for performance and trained. Initially recruited to manage customer service in the CSCC the role has been extended to manage service levels in the call centres.

2.47 The call centre manager is introducing a resource management system to ensure that the force derives the maximum benefit from its existing call centre resources. The introduction of more flexible working hours, new staff and key time working will provide the optimum balance between call volumes and available operators. Workforce modernisation has seen the return of 18.5 police officers to operational policing.

2.48 Performance measures include productivity targets, which are built into staff performance development reviews (PDRs), individual monitoring of quality of contacts, and customer perceptions which are managed through the supervisors in the call centres. Complaints are monitored and managed by the head of call management, but dealt with at the appropriate level.

2.49 Sickness absence management has been enhanced and has reduced the levels of longer term absences, although there are still some reductions to be achieved in the short-term absences which are predominantly based around individual circumstance rather than any response to working practices. Staff work 12 hour shift systems, alternating the roles equally between call taking and dispatch functions.

2.50 Investment in staff training has been increased to improve the quality and competence of the contact with members of the public. Staff are in the process of

receiving psychological communication training to ensure they have the skills to effectively manage caller contacts and expectations.

2.51 Development of incident management units (IMUs) on divisions has assisted in dealing with lower priority calls. This has reduced the pressure on the command and control systems, which were previously allocating all requests for assistance. In the absence of a dedicated resource management system to identify availability, significant pressures and incident backlogs had built up, as calls remained unallocated for significant periods. The IMU is able to manage less urgent requests for assistance at a local level through a combination of re-prioritisation, allocation to appointment cars or telephone resolution. Significant reductions in incident backlogs and levels of frustration have been achieved.

2.52 Performance management is well developed in the call centres but less so with the IMUs. Head of call management and divisional representatives meet on a six weekly basis to reduce any blockages within the system and operational protocols have been agreed to develop the model further. Working relationships between the call centres (HQ managed) and the IMU (divisionally managed) are both healthy and productive.

2.53 However, whilst performance of the call centres is monitored at a force level, and by divisional commanders, there is no corporate overview of quality standards and performance within each of the IMUs. Consequently, other than on a numerical incident log basis, divisional commanders are unable to assess whether they are deriving maximum benefit or whether they have adopted best practice. This is an area for development, given the importance of quality of contacts and public perception.

Initial Responses

2.54 The CSCC is centrally based and falls within the remit of the head, incident handling unit. This centre services both internal and external customers and is the focal point for crime recording within the force. Internally there was much criticism of the centre, principally around the difficulties of making contact from the crime scene and more generally of them over recording crimes. At the time of writing the report, an interim solution had been identified of appointing four investigators to the CSCC to act as crime advisers.

2.55 Contacting the CSCC from a crime scene is technically feasible by using the telephony feature of Airwave, but was under used because of alleged difficulties in making contact with the CSCC or because of a reluctance to provide details of the crime in the presence of the victim. Anecdotally, officers preferred to return to the station at the end of each shift and phone in from the station or use electronic means of recording. This makes it difficult for CSCC to manage its resources to match demand, thus further exacerbating the problems of contact.

2.56 Initial incident response to 999 calls and high priority calls fall to response officers whose core role is to provide first response, arrest and initial reassurance to callers.

2.57 Information from focus groups identified that, despite the creation of the volume crime teams, response officers also carried an individual, investigative workload to meet their performance targets around sanction detections. Facing

similar delays with detainees through custody and case preparation, their availability for deployment was in many cases restricted. Consequently, 999 and immediate response calls were often required to be routed through other available resources such as neighbourhood officers or roads policing officers.

2.58 PCSOs are clear about their role and deployment, as are divisional supervisors. However, a number of examples were given where PCSOs had been asked to attend incidents that were clearly beyond their remit, ability and experience to manage. They believed that pressure on dispatchers to finalise incidents resulted in pressures on them to attend. There is a need to re-state their role and responsibilities given the likely increases in numbers which will complement the NP model.

2.59 The role of the IMU was seen to be particularly effective in managing priorities at all levels, with effective liaison with the command centres in negotiating other responses, as well as having local contacts with NP staff. However, in order to balance the responses at IMU level, there was a need to create an appointment car that required resources from existing response teams. Anecdotal evidence was given of occasions when this reduced response officer numbers to levels unable to meet demand.

2.60 There is clear evidence of a performance culture and delivery of quality standards to the public within the command centres and, within existing constraints, the CSCC. The IMUs are developing well in being able to handle lower level public contacts and incident response. However, their overall effectiveness is limited to date by the numbers of changes in delivery structures at divisional level within reasonably brief time frames. In one division the reduction of three incident response patrols to two, in order to create the volume crime model in April 2006, had resulted in considerably less people responding to an increasing incident demand workload.

2.61 The pressure to increase sanction detections has blurred the distinctions between VCTs, incident response and NP to the extent that they all have the same performance objectives. Examples were given where the focus on sanction detections often resulted in attendance prioritisation from response officers being determined more from the availability of a detection rather than the graded response criteria.

2.62 The force has taken the decision not to appoint a corporate demand manager. Whilst there is some evidence of limited demand management, there is no corporate model universally applied. As such there is no formal mechanism to ensure staffing is allocated to meet operational demand. The force has done some demand profiling in the past but this has not been undertaken in a systematic manner, with continuous evaluation and review.

2.63 Chief inspectors hold functional responsibility for the 'three pillars' of volume crime, response and neighbourhood policing within each division. There is evidence of informal contacts between these functional heads but this appears ad hoc and informal. It is essential that with such distinct areas of work that there is effective communication between the units to prevent 'silo' working where different teams are unaware of activity in other units.

HMI suggests that: A structured process should be put in place to ensure effective communication between chief inspectors responsible for functional activity within divisions.

CUSTODY

2.64 The custody processes need to be as streamlined as possible to minimise the time spent by officers and staff away from patrol duty. Delays quoted by focus groups were not always substantiated by force analysis. There are undoubtedly peak demand periods when delays can occur and these are likely to increase with the increased number of prisoners that result from an increased focus on performance.

2.65 HMI was impressed with the innovative use of nurses at the Queens Gardens facility in Hull which sought to improve prisoner care and treatment whilst at the same time minimising costs associated with the use of force medical examiners (FMEs).

2.66 The force has acknowledged that custody provision needs modernisation and rationalisation and a project has been established to review it across Humberside. The first phase will be an extension to cells at headquarters, which should start in 2007 but central custody facilities north and south of the river will not be developed for three years. HMI was concerned that the scoping exercise had still not been completed, there is no plan to look at the IT infrastructure and no modelling will be undertaken. HMI was also concerned that at a time when there was a shortage of officers for neighbourhood policing, 33 constables were engaged as jailers within the cell complexes. This role has been civilianised in almost every other force.

HMI suggests that the force;

- a) Undertake a modelling exercise in relation to custody to take account of prisoner throughput, performance increases, turnaround time and staffing variations to identify the most appropriate configuration for the force;***
- b) Review the provision of IT within custody to ensure the current National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPIS) case and custody module fulfils the current and anticipated needs of the force.***

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

2.67 Several major IT developments were highlighted during the course of interviews and this represents future opportunities for improved delivery of services and staff economies. However, the head of information services branch lacked effective representation in key strategic planning meetings of the force other than to provide papers and respond to decisions made at the meetings. Examples were given of potential solutions to problems but were lacking a force business sponsor. National Management Information System (NMIS) was identified along with extension of the use of Airwave.

2.68 There is evidence of 'double keying' and interim solutions being developed to supplement force systems that do not deliver what was required. The work allocation database was being used to provide information that was unavailable from the crime

system, the intelligence form 310 had to be printed off only to have to re-key in the information into another system and numerous databases had to be filled in with the same information in the central ticket office.

HMI suggests that: The force reviews its IT requirements and determine if national solutions or tried and tested 'off the shelf' products may assist the force to better meet its immediate and future needs.

PART THREE - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

3.1 The inspection utilised specialist staff officers to examine the management of finance and personnel functions within the force. The performance of each of the functions was examined for the effectiveness and degree to which it contributed to the operational performance of Humberside Police.

PERSONNEL

3.2 Personnel and learning and development (L&D) in Humberside are overseen by the head of personnel, who reports to the DCC. Both functions are scrutinised by the police authority personnel committee. The personnel function in the field is provided by dedicated chief inspectors (at divisional level) line managed through the divisional commander with some accountability to head of personnel, and by police staff (at branch level) in the guise of personnel and support units. The chief inspectors are not professionally qualified in personnel issues, whilst police staff are qualified to varying degrees.

3.3 Stakeholders did not feel that personnel, as a function at corporate level, gives clear direction or leadership to human resource (HR) “professionals” or staff at divisional or departmental level. The inspection revealed an absence of any robust long term improvement plans for the HR function overall, although the recently appointed head of L&D has quickly identified this fact in relation to her own responsibilities and has created six strategic projects which collate outstanding improvement activities from a variety of sources and would provide for a solid L&D framework upon which to build.

HMI suggests that the force develops a comprehensive single improvement plan, containing clear milestones for both the personnel and L&D functions which are subject to monitoring at chief officer and police authority level.

3.4 Individual local and corporate personnel units and individual personnel staff, whilst perceived to provide a good service in response to specific requirements, are not working in unison when expected to by customers. Often customers need to contact and deal with a number of units and/or staff to deal with one case. Instances were provided to the inspection team of a lack of mechanisms formally holding both central and local units accountable for dealing effectively with issues. Key stakeholders identified the need for a more joined up, problem solving, customer oriented approach to HR activity, with individuals or teams taking ownership and responsibility for resolving issues.

3.5 The employee relations (ER) unit is often poorly regarded by key stakeholders. There are concerns over what is perceived as an inflexible attitude to issues on some occasions, rather than a joint problem solving approach. Perceptions were that engagement with the ER unit more often than not exacerbated a problem. There are welcome signs of a more collaborative approach emerging with the involvement of the Chief Constable and DCC.

3.6 Corporate personnel department (CP) does not test the effectiveness or quality of people related services provided. The application of policies is not routinely monitored for diversity impact. Many stakeholders were unsure about the structure

and responsibilities of the various local and central personnel units and would welcome greater communication and marketing of personnel services. Concerns were expressed about the speed in which CP responded to customer needs, many of which were often urgent operational needs for which swift responses were required.

3.7 Personnel stakeholders believe that they effectively engage with their customers and partners. However, the levels of consultation to establish customer needs are those which would be associated with a 'traditional' personnel service, focused on providing an administrative support function rather than an 'enabling' function which directly contributes to operational performance.

3.8 Whilst the force has been reasonably content with this level of service, it does not support a performance driven culture focused on operational priorities. The stated vision for the personnel function of 'putting the right people in the right place at the right time,' was supported by limited evidence of how this was going to be achieved in a pre-planned, systematic or strategic way. Recent events show this not to be the case, with initiatives such as the volume crime model placing untrained, and in some cases unwilling people into place.

3.9 A system of performance measurement for personnel issues was in place but is limited in respect of the extent to which CP is supporting operational activities. At divisional level, performance measurement is ad hoc, unsystematic and lacking corporacy. Whilst there are some measurement criteria, eg sickness and PDR completion, the measures do not possess any real degree of utility, and none are underpinned by scrutiny or direction from CP. There was little evidence that staff are clear over what was expected of them and are held accountable through effective performance measurement.

3.10 At divisional level, the concept of systematic people planning (numbers and skills) has yet to be developed. Key stakeholders have no formal mechanisms to capture customer needs. Those mechanisms in place tend to be reactive and short term in nature. At corporate level, the planning of workforce requirements does not encompass skills and is focused on the short-term, i.e. the next year. An opportunity exists for greater stakeholder involvement to support operational need.

RECOMMENDATION 4

The force should transform the personnel function into a holistic and enabling service, managed by the centre through a revised HR model, the core of which must ensure:

- ***robust governance arrangements at chief officer and police authority level;***
- ***proactive stakeholder engagement;***
- ***clearly articulated demand management processes;***
- ***clearly articulated performance criterion for the function;***
- ***clearly articulated stakeholder access procedures; and***
- ***clearly articulated review mechanisms.***

3.11 PDR is starting to become embedded, however it is only seen by most staff and managers as an historical review mechanism and consequently does not drive

performance. Whilst staff are set objectives there has yet to be a review to establish whether objectives being set are in support of operational policing. Nor are PDRs utilised for related personnel processes, such as selection, promotion and succession planning.

3.12 CP has developed a 'conversion plan' to identify opportunities for civilianisation, with 312 posts identified but this did not include a further 33 constable posts in custody. There are many 'back room' posts occupied by police officers that in other forces are undertaken by police staff. At the time of the inspection the plan had yet to be communicated to key stakeholders. Throughout the inspection activity numerous opportunities for civilianisation and different job mixes between officers and police staff were identified to HMIC. The conversion paper seeks to address issues which the inspection revealed as priority areas and therefore should be treated as such. The plan, which has yet to be subject to force scrutiny, should also address the need for the posts before consideration of conversion. It is also important that it is sufficiently targeted at all aspects of workforce modernisation, particularly as this will release resources to operational policing.

3.13 There was little evidence to suggest that the opportunities provided by workforce modernisation beyond civilianisation are fully recognised and thus may well not be fully exploited.

RECOMMENDATION 5

The force should undertake a comprehensive personnel review in line with workforce modernisation principles to form the basis of the improvement plan referred to above.

LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT

3.14 Governance of the learning and development (L&D) function is provided by the force training and supervision board (TSB) which meets approximately every two months. Representation of customer interests is through P&S units described above. The recently appointed head of L&D received many plaudits and was aware of many of the issues and was taking action.

3.15 Departmental heads consider that the present arrangements mean that they have an insufficiently robust operational input into the meetings, as their staff have no operational experience to draw upon during debates. They felt this resulted in an imbalance in outcomes weighted towards divisions. This situation may become more acute in the short-term as police staff take on the personnel role in divisions.

HMI suggests that: The force introduces revised stakeholder engagement process for L&D which ensure sustainable operational input into the creation and maintenance of the L&D plan.

3.16 The costed training plan (CTP) is inaccurate and is not used as a management tool. There is some doubt as to the relationship of the plan to the operational policing objectives of Humberside Police and data in the plan is questionable. A number of errors in the plan were identified by B-Plan (software

company which is supplying facilities management to Humberside for the development and management of their CTP, which do not appear to have been resolved.

HMI suggests that: The force repeats the self assessment of the L&D function with the guidance of specialist HMIC staff officers and that the findings are utilised in the creation of the overarching single improvement plan already referred to above.

3.17 Divisions are developing their own resolutions to skills gaps by localised training. An example is investigative training where experienced detectives were being used to 'coach' less experienced officers, and in one division, where a full-time trainer's post has been independently created in order to service local needs due to a perceived lack of response from the centre. This ad hoc approach is invisible to the centre and lacks any form of governance and quality assurance process.

3.18 A positive approach to training, through the 'street craft' training programme was identified as noteworthy practice. It has recently won a national police training award. The inspection revealed however, that this commendable initiative has now been focused almost exclusively on PCSOs, which leaves the very target audience it was designed for without the support the initiative was created to address.

3.19 There is little confidence amongst staff (officers and police staff) as to the capabilities of first line managers (as a whole) to perform day-to-day people management activities. This lack of confidence was also evident from first line managers themselves. There is a clear need for comprehensive management training at this key level. This needs to be supported in the workplace for individuals to develop the capability to apply the learning, together with an effective and easily accessed force-wide personnel and training function.

3.20 The core leadership development programme (CLDP), currently encompassing sergeants and inspectors and some police staff, has been established to address this need for enhanced first line manager capability. Whilst this is supported as a step in the right direction, CLDP was not designed to cover all the people management aspects of the first line manager role. A broader learning and development process encompassing basic operational skills, eg golden hour, file preparation and resource planning, is required, against which CLDP would sit.

RECOMMENDATION 6

The force should undertake an organisational skills audit at all ranks and grades to ensure that necessary skills are in place and that the training plan is accurately informed. Those skills which require a training response should be prioritised by a suitable prioritisation model.

Strategic Direction – Personnel and L&D

3.21 HMI is concerned that the significant areas of work that need to be undertaken within the personnel and L&D portfolios require a clear strategic direction and a considerable investment in both time and expertise. The goal will be a modern

human resource and training function that supports the force and delivers on its stated aim of 'right people in the right place at the right time'.

3.22 The current chief officer portfolios identify the DCC as strategic lead for personnel and training whilst also having responsibility for strategic development. The importance of both these areas cannot be underestimated if the force is to deliver sustainable long-term performance improvement.

3.23 In many forces a strategic director at chief officer level, with specific experience of personnel and training, has been appointed to drive the sort of strategic and tactical review necessary of personnel and training and deliver on the recommendations. HMI believes that this approach would benefit Humberside Police.

RECOMMENDATION 7

The force should recruit a head of personnel and training at chief officer level to drive a fundamental review of personnel and training.

FINANCE

Budget

3.24 Unlike many forces Humberside finds itself in a healthy position financially with significant reserves which will assist them to fund significant investment in years to come. Budgetary control in Humberside follows best practice with budgets devolved to BCU commanders and heads of departments; this accounts for 75% of the total budget. The remaining 25% are 'protected budgets' which are controlled by the strategy team but managed on a day to day basis by branch managers.

3.25 As at 31 October 2006 devolved budgets were forecast to be underspent in 2006/07 by £0.59m. The protected budgets were forecast to be underspent in 2006/07 by £2.94m. A key factor in the underspend on protected budgets has been the call handling project as a result of slippage, mainly through a decision to delay the purchase of new systems until 'core business systems have been implemented'.

3.26 Budget reporting in the force is appropriate and the force has a good business planning model which emphasises the importance of the use of business cases. There is general agreement that the assistant chief officer (ACO) has good leadership and finance skills and has an effective working relationship with the police authority director of performance and resources.

3.27 The budget presentation appears to indicate larger levels of surplus as a result of slippage than would appear, where a more conventional presentation is used (with all capital projects linked into the capital programme) which would treat such movements outside of the conventional budget (revenue contributions to capital) via a capital fund. However, budget underspending has, over the years, been a feature of Humberside and this has been noted in previous HMIC baseline assessments and in the external auditor's annual letter. The external auditor's observation underlines the key factors, namely;

- Budgets which provide for 100% of pay for staff and police officers in post (i.e. no vacancy discount), resulting in significant underspends; and
- regular slippage in the capital programme.

3.28 The former is evidence of a conservative approach to budgeting.

3.29 While overall budgetary reports are adequate there remains a concern that the information and decision-making process around budgets is reactive and not proactive. Evidence indicates that underspends are not identified sufficiently early in the financial year to allow resources to be proactively managed and redeployed. There are some weaknesses in budgetary control and a more proactive approach to in-year budget management would be appropriate.

3.30 A significant element of the investment programme (and hence the capital programme) has been the move to geographical policing through the 'innovative partnership design and build contract' for the LPT programme. The force expects that the 34 construction projects costing over £22m will now be complete by March 2008.

3.31 Weaknesses in the budgetary control process have been recognised by the force. In particular the ACO has emphasised in a presentation to the ACPO team and commanders a 'less than optimal level of':

- Attention to technical areas of budget management such as budget profiles and outturn forecasting;
- In-year budget management by SMTs including challenges to the affordability and sustainability of change proposals; and
- evidence that the current budget is being managed proactively to drive maximum performance.

3.32 A revision to the resource performance assessment framework (RPAF) has been recently introduced. This requires all divisions and branches to produce business plans to utilise underspends to quarterly COG resource meetings.

3.33 Previous baseline assessments and the external auditor's use of resources assessment have emphasised the need for additional professional central finance staff and for the skills and competencies of BCU/department business managers to be reviewed. The ACO has confirmed that approval for two additional finance staff has been agreed and he expects to have them in post early in 2007.

Reserves

3.34 The key feature of Humberside's reserves is that they have been generally created in previous years from underspending balances – especially on pay and from specific allocations for developments. The largest item in the reserves is the investment reserves. The 2005 audit letter explained that the financial position was 'sound' but that the apparent level of reserves was not as extensive as it appears given:

- the need to fund PCSOs will require £6m of investment; and
- the capital programme requires £13m of investment for the period to March 2009.

3.35 Taking these factors into account the external auditor notes that “this leaves an estimated balance in the investment reserves of £3m”.

3.36 Humberside Police has a comparatively strong level of reserves which are mainly earmarked for developments/investment and will be used over the next five years.

3.37 The force accepts the need for a more proactive approach and this has been reflected in the most recent five year financial forecast which provides for the funding of additional PCSOs – no longer to be funded by the Home Office.

3.38 The general professional advice on local authority reserves is that reserves should be between 2% and 5% but taking account of local circumstances and risks. For Humberside this would justify a general reserve of £8m. In particular for policing there is a need to hold a general reserve to meet the normal requirements of a working balance but to provide for potential risks such as major incidents.

3.39 The most recent five year financial forecast indicates that the level of the investment reserve will fall from £24.7m as at March 2007 to £6.5m as at March 2012.

3.40 HMI is pleased to note that:

- The force is already introducing new procedures on budget monitoring to ensure that budget holders prepare business cases where underspends are forecast;
- two additional finance staff are being recruited;
- a 2% vacancy factor is being introduced into the 2007/08 budget to provide a framework for a better alignment of resource deployment and performance; and
- funds have been set aside (£4m) to pump prime workforce modernisation.

HMI believes that further action is needed and suggests that:

- 1. The bulk of funds in the police pension reserve, approximately £1m, is released for appropriate pump priming of performance against approved business cases.***
- 2. The force should review the competencies and skills of the resource support to commanders and department heads and ensure that in business plan submissions resources are clearly linked to improvement in performance.***
- 3. The force should ensure that any underspends are identified early in the year with resources diverted to priority areas for performance improvement and that all divisions and branches should have business plans in place ‘ready to go’ for use when resources become available.***

PART FOUR - CORPORATE GOVERNANCE/STRATEGIC DIRECTION

PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

4.1 Effective performance management structures and processes are vital for any force seeking performance improvement. The inspection focused on the current structure and processes and their effectiveness and likelihood of delivering future improvements.

4.2 The DCC is the strategic lead for performance management while responsibility for delivery is delegated to divisional commanders with ACC (operations) monitoring progress. Police authority officers and members are present at performance monitoring meetings at both strategic and divisional level.

4.3 Performance improvement has recently been tightly linked with the formal engagement process and the stated aspiration to be disengaged. Particular attention has been given to the sanction detection rate and narrowing the gap between Humberside and the average of the MSF group. There is only a limited focus on the other domains of PPAF and objectives and priorities in the annual policing plan.

4.4 Corporately, there is little consideration of partnership delivery and no apparent discussion of issues around, or data relating to, local criminal justice board (LCJB), crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs), local area agreements (LAAs) or the resource performance assessment framework (RPAF). This is in contrast to the situation in divisions where there is evidence of partnership participation in co-ordinating meetings, coordinated activity and a wider conception of performance.

4.5 There was evidence that performance is scrutinised at different levels of the organisation, from the DCC's monthly performance meeting, which considers themed issues such as violent crime or burglary through quarterly reviews of divisions by the ACC (operations) to monthly divisional challenge meetings and local 'pillar' challenges with the relevant chief inspectors where local performance is examined (a similar structure exists for departments albeit not as frequent). However, it was not clear if the overall performance of the force is ever considered, taking cognisance of the full range of data available across a wider platform.

4.6 There is considerable overlap with the 'routine' performance management arrangements both in the issues considered and the attendees and other similar meetings such as Pegasus. The force acknowledged some of these concerns and the corporate Pegasus meetings have been cancelled.

4.7 The focus is currently dominated by sanction detections and latterly crime reduction and the position of Humberside relative to the MSF average - as illustrated by iQuanta charts. The force has been successful with this approach in improving performance in a number of key areas (see appendix 1). However other criteria and other performance priorities are not given equivalent attention or scrutiny. This is undoubtedly due to the engagement process but in the long term, post engagement, there needs to be a more mature, broader assessment of performance.

4.8 There is scope to further integrate and streamline the different fora in which performance data is considered and performance is debated to minimise the abstraction of senior staff. The relationship and hierarchy is not clear. At level 2, the NIM and performance are not connected eg, the control strategy and priorities, however, there are emergent links between performance and intelligence products developing at divisional level.

4.9 As performance arrangements mature the opportunity exists to link and embed intelligence products and NIM in the performance management process. This will give opportunities to better inform business planning.

4.10 At a corporate level, the consideration of performance is narrowly focused with the sanction detection rate being the principal consideration. Despite this, there was no emphasis given to offenders brought to justice. The interest and scrutiny of crime reduction focuses on acquisitive offences and crimes of violence. Little attention is given to the British Crime Survey (BCS) comparator crimes and criminal damage. There is evidence that some divisions have set criminal damage reduction targets and given neighbourhood teams responsibility for their delivery. There is no evidence that more serious offences are considered in the strategic performance meetings.

4.11 There is evidence that call handling/contact management is scrutinised at a local level and HMI was pleased to note that there has been marked performance improvements in these areas.

4.12 The performance data sets that are presented are concise, clear and include a prospective view (the capacity) to the end of the reporting period. These are supplemented with appropriate extracts from iQuanta depicting the projections and short-term peer comparisons. These are accurately and objectively described. However, the discussion prompted by the data is generally superficial and does not sufficiently probe apparent successes to establish how results were achieved and sustained. The exploration of apparent under performance is similarly shallow and regularly led to discussion of recording practices both in Humberside and in other forces. Considerations of administrative and recording practices were pre-eminent in those discussions of performance that were observed during the inspection.

4.13 At divisional level, a greater understanding of underlying causes was evident and the scrutiny made the necessary transition from consideration of the numbers into consideration of victims, offenders and locations.

4.14 A performance culture was more evident during the inspection than earlier in 2006 and the force is moving in the right direction with further reinforcement of the model being undertaken. The absence of data to unit/team or constable level had been a gap in the process and it was difficult to scrutinise performance at that level. This has been rectified in the last quarter of 2006 but at the time of the inspection had not had time to embed and impact on culture. Encouragingly those staff questioned welcomed the changes and appear willing to embrace the new culture.

4.15 Clearly articulated priorities are important in any performance regime and during the inspection it was apparent that everybody understood the priority was sanction detections. This priority whilst clearly understood, was too narrowly focused, PDR objectives had been changed, some partnership work had been put on hold and specialist units were redirecting activity to achieve 'quick hits', eg arresting

shoplifters. There was very little evidence of all the priorities from the annual policing plan being subject to scrutiny, featuring in the performance review process or driving activity.

4.16 Crime data is now made available daily and used by ACC (operations) to challenge divisional commanders. However, there is evidence that this process takes limited account of the operational context and is narrowly focused. There was comment that, on occasion, little appreciation is given to those more serious crimes or incidents which have occurred but which are resource intensive thereby diverting activity away from volume crime areas.

4.17 NMIS provides access to the crime data and has been used to create a number of local performance products that are updated at different frequencies. Individual performance information is a recent addition to this suite of information as are 'enabling indicators' that provide useful 'diagnostics' to the headline data. Local data and products are supplemented with views from iQuanta. These are used to illustrate the gap with the most similar group averages and trajectory towards it. The most commonly used views are bar charts comparing most similar groups and the projections charts. The latter provides the most reliable estimate of crime levels. The commentary provided to the iQuanta derived charts is accurate and objective.

4.18 Encouragingly, the NMIS derived products have become the 'definitive' source for the information and there was evidence that data challenges are consigned to history and people are now starting to focus on interpretation of the data that is refreshed daily, fortnightly or monthly. The products are not particularly engaging, relying heavily on tabulations and being accompanied by a minimal written commentary. Such commentary, both written and verbal, that does accompany the products is generally descriptive, albeit objective and accurate. There is scope to further refine the products and incorporate analytical statistics and commentary. The current products place the onus on the user to interpret the information. Some 'quality assurance' indicators are included in the suite of 'enabling indicators'.

4.19 Short-term comparisons (eg, comparing two week periods) have been developed to service the Pegasus programme – these should be treated as transitional objects to help develop an understanding of the data but their long-term use is not advocated.

4.20 The ease with which NMIS collates information from the crime recording system belies the continuing difficulties and concerns with how crime is recorded. Considerable effort is expended in correcting (eg, reclassification, 'no-criming' – up to 10% in some divisions) deficiencies in initial crime recording (see comments in volume crime section).

4.21 BCUs have embraced the three pillars and there is clear evidence of alignment, at a local level, between NIM and performance which was actively informing priority setting and the disposition of resources. Appropriate local targets had been set in order to influence operational activity – eg criminal damage reduction targets for neighbourhood teams.

4.22 There appeared to be no plans at present to provide opportunities for inputs at key roles and ranks to develop understanding of performance management as opposed to the current focus on measurement.

4.23 The drive for disengagement could be interpreted as shorthand for performance improvement but it appears to have become an end in itself and caused a narrowing of considerations and shortening of timeframes. It has been suggested that an emphasis on the sanction detection rate was a route to improved morale and a device to introduce a performance management culture. However, the manner in which a single issue is being pursued risks deflecting attention from other key business areas.

4.24 There is a perception that disengagement has become an end in itself, which has caused a narrowing of considerations and a shortening of timeframes. Notwithstanding this, the force is crucially aware of the issues and is taking active steps to broaden its understanding of the process issues, broaden its approach to performance data and increase its evaluation and monitoring of system changes to highlight good practice and/or unintended consequences arising from the changes.

4.25 The force has come a long way in a relatively short period of time in developing a performance management regime, the most recent addition being the development of data for unit and team level assessment. The engagement process has undoubtedly focused the force on a limited number of key areas of performance but this should be viewed as a short-term approach and a broader understanding of performance needs to be developed and understood in order to take the force forward in the medium and long-term.

RECOMMENDATION 8

The force should base the assessment of performance on a broader set of indicators that better reflect all business areas and take cognisance of partnership issues. There should be more depth to the analysis to develop a better understanding of causation. There should be staff training to improve the understanding and application of performance management techniques.

CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT AND BUSINESS PLANNING

4.26 Corporate development branch has responsibility to deal with business change and planning for the future. It was evident that the head of department did not have the capacity to deal with this as effectively as he would have liked through the current emphasis on performance and disengagement issues, which also fell within his portfolio.

4.27 There was an absence of a strategic plan to guide developments and to provide a blueprint for the future. There is a business change process in which both COG and strategy team have a role but at the time of the inspection the focus for delivery rested with the Pegasus programme board that was established to address issues associated with disengagement. Initiatives designed to address identified areas for improvement had been driven by Pegasus with some success, notably the doubling of investigative training. There was a consensus that this forum was becoming the delivery vehicle for the force, making up for a lack of planning and

delivery elsewhere in the organisation. The lack of planning capacity within the corporate development branch made the reliance on Pegasus somewhat inevitable.

4.28 A recent decision is that the Pegasus programme board will no longer meet and disengagement issues will be addressed in a fortnightly meeting between key staff and chaired by the DCC. A lack of capacity in corporate development, a focus on disengagement and a lack of obvious co-ordination between functions addressing business change means there is a lack of evidence of strong links between performance, planning, budgeting and resource planning – albeit the force acknowledges this and activity is in place to address these interconnections. The role performed by the police authority in developing the policing plan taking cognisance of the views of partners and other stakeholders, was viewed favourably.

4.29 There was evidence of huge levels of commitment and localised developments such as IMUs which, once captured and promulgated force-wide within a corporate framework have added significant value and improvement. However, there is an absence of formal mechanisms to capture such developments and an apparent reluctance to adopt such practices for fear of impacting on the focus on disengagement and sanction detections.

4.30 There were individual meetings or groups addressing change issues in isolation but no obvious corporate structure or meeting that brings together all of the different workstreams or functions (eg HR, training, IT, operations, custody etc) under one programme management regime. Such a structure would ensure co-ordination, undertake impact assessments and identify potential blockages to delivery and strategic planning.

RECOMMENDATION 9

The force should establish a corporate structure involving key stakeholders and business areas which provides opportunities for debate, risk assessment, strategic planning and the effective co-ordination of change management.

4.31 There is currently an absence of clear corporate policy in a number of key areas such as crime reduction, partnerships, children and young persons (*Every Child Matters*). HMI believes these gaps in policy provision need to be addressed urgently. Policy development is important but equally policy compliance needs to be effective. There was little evidence of how the force ensures that policies are actually implemented and working effectively.

4.32 The current corporate development branch includes many corporate administrative functions that could sit elsewhere thus freeing up the head of branch who was also preoccupied with the engagement process either directly or indirectly. There was little evidence of any strategic planning capability that could identify future opportunities and threats, challenge current thinking and develop new ideas.

RECOMMENDATION 10

The force should review the role and structure of the corporate development branch, to ensure it has the skills and capacity to provide effective business risk management, planning processes and strategic thinking that will develop the force for the future.

4.33 The chief officer portfolios lack clarity in some areas, notably young persons, burglary and personnel. HMI is particularly anxious that an over concentration on personnel issues is deflecting the DCC's effort away from the strategic responsibilities of that role. Mixing operational responsibility with corporate policy and strategic direction can create a tension and it is felt best to separate these responsibilities. It is also important that chief officers have a clear understanding of business change and programme management and are able to drive issues within their relevant portfolios. There was some evidence that chief officers may benefit from some form of developmental training in this area to enable them to drive delivery of key projects and workstreams.

4.34 The Chief Constable may wish to review the roles and portfolios of the top team in the light of this report and its recommendations.

4.35 Morale appears better in many areas as the recent changes have settled down and there is now more clarity. Yet, throughout the inspection there were constant references to the historical context. It is important not to lose sight of the history of the force but there is a danger it becomes an excuse for current inactivity or lack of innovation and there should be a drive to change this negative culture into a more positive forward looking attitude. Disengagement would help and provide a much deserved boost to the organisation for all the effort expended in recent years but disengagement alone will not reverse the preoccupation with the past without clear drive and positive leadership from the chief officer team.

4.36 There was a lack of clarity amongst staff at varying levels about the direction of the organisation save for the immediate focus on disengagement. The change in structure from LPTs to the three pillar model and the introduction of volume crime teams had left some officers confused as to priorities and delivery. There are many good staff in Humberside who want to provide an excellent service to the public but they desire stability and a clear focus – there are signs of that developing in divisions but there is a need for corporate direction. A clear vision of where Humberside police is going and what is expected of the staff is vital to provide the necessary focus. Senior officers have acknowledged this and have started a process to deliver a vision and blueprint for the future during February 2007.

HMI is pleased the process has commenced but suggests that there is a need for the chief officers to expedite the process and re-state what is important, clearly and concisely and develop a clear vision and strategy that will take the force forward and provide staff with a clear understanding of what are the priorities of Humberside Police and what is expected of them.

PART FIVE - CONCLUSIONS

5.1 The inspection found a determination and commitment throughout the organisation to move Humberside from its current position and restore pride in its reputation for delivering a good service to its communities. Interviews with focus groups and key stakeholders underpinned this view. The Chief Constable's immediate priority is achieving disengagement through performance improvement while developing a clear direction for the force.

5.2 Improvements in the way calls for service were handled in the last 12 months are noteworthy and evidence of what can be achieved given leadership, innovation and commitment. There is still more to be achieved but there are plans and resources earmarked to deliver on them.

5.3 There is evidence of emerging improvements in the use of resources, as more flexible and dynamic systems of managing finance and planning are being introduced. However, this is not yet embedded with a revised strategic planning structure which needs to be prioritised and the consideration of a demand management facility to ensure best fit between demand and resources.

5.4 The role of the Pegasus programme board has been noted for the way in which it focused effort on eradicating blockages and began to introduce a more structured process to ensure effective delivery. This ethos needs to be replicated in a more dynamic strategic planning and co-ordination group which will service the needs of the force in the future.

5.5 The police authority, in conjunction with the force, has recognised the need for a review of their systems and structures to better assist the force in a role of 'critical friend' and key stakeholder. To that end the authority has asked HMIC for support in improving its accountability arrangements and this will be subject of a separate management report direct to the police authority.

5.6 The focus of the force is too narrow at present. Issues around crime reduction, partnerships, response policing and citizen focus have, under current circumstances, been given lesser consideration. There is evidence of a 'skewing' of the organisation away from some of its core priorities which needs to be redressed.

5.7 Partnership working and co-ordination is in need of review and resourcing to ensure that the force derives the maximum benefits for crime reduction and funding across the whole of Humberside. Its importance to the structure and delivery of the neighbourhood policing model should not be underestimated.

5.8 The performance management framework has had some success but now needs to be extended in both scope and involvement. It is predominantly divisionally focused and there needs to be a corporate buy-in to the systems from support departments and branches.

5.9 The personnel function is in need of a root and branch review to ensure that it is more focused and dynamic in delivering the requirements of modern operational policing. It would benefit from the appointment of a strategic manager at ACO level to ensure it is part of the key delivery and decision making at COG meetings and to bring a strategic dimension to HR within Humberside.

5.10 The current assessment of the force is that it has an ability to focus on issues and create results in a narrow field. However, this has often been at the expense of other key areas of policing and business management which, if improvements are to be sustainable, need to be considered. There are many areas for which the force has received national praise such as CBRN training, Operation Dacron in the 2006 Justice Awards and their approach to the handling of 'fail to appear' warrants. HMI is pleased to recognise these successful initiatives. There is also evidence that the force has begun to recognise many of the issues highlighted in this report and is taking steps to plan for them. However, many of the areas highlighted are business critical and are well established in other forces, Humberside needs to address the suggestions and recommendations with some urgency.

5.11 A decision is required in April 2007 as to whether Humberside can be disengaged on the basis of current performance and its sustainability. Given the renewed focus and activity around a number of issues in this report Her Majesty's Inspector intends to revisit the force in March 2007 to gauge progress on key areas and, in the interim, to receive monthly progress reports on the recommendations and suggestions.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Her Majesty's Inspector makes ten recommendations:

1. The force should invest in an adequately resourced community safety branch which should develop and oversee a comprehensive crime reduction strategy that takes due cognisance of the role of partner agencies and the importance of understanding tried and tested methods of reducing crime.

[Para 2.16 refers]

2. The force should review the use of fixed penalty notices for crime to ensure they are being used both ethically and appropriately and ensure the correct means of disposal for those young people arrested for crime.

[Para 2.31 refers]

3. The force should ensure that the intelligence systems and associated processes, citizen focused performance management, resource management and the management of risk are effectively developed and co-ordinated to maximise the benefits of neighbourhood policing.

[Para 2.43 refers]

4. The force should transform the personnel function into a holistic and enabling service, managed by the centre through a revised HR Model, the core of which must ensure:

- robust governance arrangements at chief officer and police authority level;
- proactive stakeholder engagement;
- clearly articulated demand management processes;
- clearly articulated performance criterion for the function;
- clearly articulated stakeholder access procedures; and
- clearly articulated review mechanisms.

[Para 3.10 refers]

5. The force should undertake a comprehensive personnel review in line with workforce modernisation principles to form the basis of the improvement plan referred to above.

[Para 3.13 refers]

6. The force should undertake an organisational skills audit at all ranks and grades to ensure that necessary skills are in place and that the training plan is accurately informed. Those skills which require a training response should be prioritised by a suitable prioritisation model.

[Para 3.20 refers]

7. The force should recruit a head of personnel and training at chief officer level to drive a fundamental review of personnel and training.

[Para 3.23 refers]

8. The force should base the assessment of performance on a broader set of indicators that better reflect all business areas and take cognisance of partnership issues. There should be more depth to the analysis to develop a better

understanding of causation. There should be staff training to improve the understanding and application of performance management techniques.

[Para 4.25 refers]

9. The force should establish a corporate structure involving key stakeholders and business areas which provides opportunities for debate, risk assessment, strategic planning and the effective co-ordination of change management.

[Para 4.30 refers]

10. The force should review the role and structure of the corporate development branch, to ensure it has the skills and capacity to provide effective business risk management, planning processes and strategic thinking that will develop the force for the future.

[Para 4.32 refers]

SUMMARY OF SUGGESTIONS

Her Majesty's Inspector makes eleven suggestions:

1. The force implements a solution to the crime recording problems at the earliest opportunity.

[Para 2.4 refers]

2. The force builds on the good local links between BCUs and partners by formalising a strategic meeting between the Chief Constable and the chief executives and other key partners.

[Para 2.11 refers]

3. The force ensures compatibility between the force data systems and key partners to enable data sharing to be more effective and efficient. Consideration could be given to supporting the creation of a pan Humberside or sub regional 'data observatory'.

[Para 2.15 refers]

4. A structured process should be put in place to ensure effective communication between chief inspectors responsible for functional activity within divisions.

[Para 2.63 refers]

5. The force:

- a) undertake a modelling exercise in relation to custody to take account of prisoner throughput, performance increases, turnaround time and staffing variations to identify the most appropriate configuration for the force; and
- b) review the provision of IT within custody to ensure the current NSPIS case and custody module fulfils the current and anticipated needs of the force.

[Para 2.66 refers]

6. The force reviews its IT requirements and determine if national solutions or tried and tested 'off the shelf' products may assist the force to better meet its immediate and future needs.

[Para 2.68 refers]

7. The force develops a comprehensive single improvement plan, containing clear milestones for both the personnel and L&D functions which are subject to monitoring at chief officer and police authority level.

[Para 3.3 refers]

8. The force introduces revised stakeholder engagement process for L&D which ensure sustainable operational input into the creation and maintenance of the L&D plan.

[Para 3.15 refers]

9. The force repeats the self-assessment of the L&D function with the guidance of specialist HMIC staff officers and that the findings are utilised in the creation of the overarching single improvement plan already referred to above.

[Para 3.16 refers]

10. That:

- a) The bulk of funds in the police pension reserve, approximately £1m, is released for appropriate pump priming of performance against approved business cases.
- b) The force should review the competencies and skills of the resource support to commanders and department heads and ensure that in business plan submissions resources are clearly linked to improvement in performance.
- c) The force should ensure that any underspends are identified early in the year with resources diverted to priority areas for performance improvement and that all divisions and branches should have business plans in place 'ready to go' for use when resources become available.

[Para 3.40 refers]

11. There is a need for the chief officers to expedite the process and restate what is important clearly and concisely and develop a clear vision and strategy that will take the force forward and provide staff with a clear understanding of what are the priorities of Humberside Police and what is expected of them.

[Para 4.36 refers]


APPENDIX ONE: Humberside Performance Information

Humberside's MSF group includes five other forces: Durham, Lancashire, Gwent, South Wales and South Yorkshire.

Customer Service and Accessibility data					
Indicator	October 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to September 2006	Change	MSF group mean	Ranked position in MSF group
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and road traffic collisions satisfied with respect to making contact with the police	87.35%	87.10%	-0.25 p.p.	89.45%	6
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and road traffic collisions satisfied with respect to action taken by the police	72.29%	72.47%	0.18 p.p.	76.59%	6
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and road traffic collisions satisfied with respect to being kept informed of progress	54.59%	63.24%	8.66 p.p.	57.71%	2
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and road traffic collisions satisfied with respect to their treatment by staff	88.62%	89.88%	1.26 p.p.	88.70%	4
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and road traffic collisions satisfied with respect to the overall service provided	74.26%	77.92%	3.65 p.p.	77.47%	3
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and road traffic collisions very/completely satisfied with respect to making contact with the police	59.41%	65.11%	5.70 p.p.	69.56%	5
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and road traffic collisions very/completely satisfied with respect to action taken by the police	48.21%	52.32%	4.11 p.p.	56.61%	6
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and road traffic collisions very/completely satisfied with respect to being kept informed of progress	33.20%	39.11%	5.91 p.p.	38.49%	4
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and road traffic collisions very/completely satisfied with respect to their treatment by staff	66.95%	71.21%	4.25 p.p.	72.91%	5
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and road traffic collisions very/completely satisfied with respect to the overall service provided	51.71%	56.80%	5.09 p.p.	58.04%	5


Volume Crime Reduction					
Indicator	January to December 2005	January to December 2006	Change	MSF group mean	Ranked position in MSF group
Total crime per 1,000 population	131.16	128.84	-1.77%	107.23	6
Domestic burglary per 1,000 households	19.51	18.29	-6.24%	13.18	5
Robbery per 1,000 population	1.26	1.43	12.99%	0.86	6
Vehicle crime per 1,000 population	18.18	15.76	-13.33%	15.24	4
Violent crime per 1,000 population	27.86	29.66	6.45%	22.17	6

Chart to show the total crime per 1,000 population:



Volume Crime Investigation					
Indicator	January to December 2005	January to December 2006	Change	MSF group mean	Ranked position in MSF group
Total crime detection rate	21.73%	23.68%	1.95 p.p.	27.96%	6
Domestic burglary detection rate	11.64%	15.00%	3.36 p.p.	19.62%	6
Robbery detection rate	15.04%	18.98%	3.94 p.p.	28.35%	6
Vehicle crime detection rate	8.09%	10.16%	2.07 p.p.	14.13%	5
Violent crime detection rate	43.66%	43.27%	-0.39 p.p.	52.73%	6
Total crime sanction detection rate	19.45%	22.55%	3.11 p.p.	26.65%	6
Domestic burglary sanction detection rate	11.02%	14.59%	3.57 p.p.	18.98%	5
Robbery sanction detection rate	14.41%	18.58%	4.17 p.p.	27.58%	6
Vehicle crime sanction detection rate	7.46%	9.60%	2.14 p.p.	13.86%	5
Violent crime sanction detection rate	38.29%	40.66%	2.37 p.p.	49.10%	6


Chart to show the detection and sanction detection rates (monthly):



Neighbourhood Policing and Problem Solving						
Indicator	July 2005 to June 2006	Confidence Interval ¹	Range high and low	MSF July 2005 to June 2006	MSF Confidence Interval	MSF Range high and low
BCS % of people who think their local police do a good job	40.0%	4.1%	44.2% 35.9%	47.3%	1.7%	49.0% 45.6%
Using the British Crime Survey, the risk of personal crime	5.6%	1.5%	7.1% 4.1%	6.4%	0.8%	7.3% 5.6%
Using the British Crime Survey, the risk of household crime	17.9%	3.1%	21.0% 14.8%	20.5%	1.3%	21.8% 19.2%

Criminal Justice Processes					
Indicator	October 2004 to September 2005	October 2005 to September 2006	Change	MSF group mean	Ranked position in MSF group
Number of offences brought to justice (OBTJs)	23,317	24,830	7%	28,852	-
% of offences brought to justice	19.9%	21.4%	1.6 % pts	26.8%	6

Chart to show the % of offences brought to justice (source iQuanta):



Comparison Chart - OBTJ per Crime - Humberside - All Offences - 01 Nov 03 - 30 Sep 06


Reducing Anti-Social Behaviour					
Indicator	January to December 2005	January to December 2006	Change	MSF group mean	Ranked position in MSF group
Criminal damage per 1,000 population	29.20	29.78	1.99%	27.33	5

¹ Confidence interval at 95%

Reducing Anti-Social Behaviour						
Indicator	July 2005 to June 2006	Confidence Interval ²	Range high and low	MSF July 2005 to June 2006	MSF Confidence Interval	MSF Range high and low
BCS percentage very worried about burglary	12.2%	2.9%	15.1% 9.4%	11.8%	1.1%	12.9% 10.7%
BCS percentage with high levels of worry about car crime	10.7%	2.5%	13.1% 8.2%	14.3%	1.4%	15.6% 12.9%
BCS percentage with high levels of worry about violent crime	12.4%	3.0%	15.4% 9.4%	13.0%	1.4%	14.4% 11.6%
BCS percentage perceiving a high level of anti-social behaviour	16.1%	3.7%	19.8% 12.4%	18.1%	1.6%	19.7% 16.4%

Contact Centre Management					
Indicator	October 2005 to March 2006	April 2006 to September 2006	Change	MSF group mean	Ranked position in MSF group
% of 999 calls answered within locally set target time of 10 seconds	87.65%	87.83%	0.18 p.p.	83.52%	2

Chart to show the % of 999 calls answered within the target time of 10 seconds



Strategic Roads Policing				
Indicator	Financial year 2004/05	Financial year 2005/06	Change	MSF group mean
The number of people killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions per 100 million vehicle kilometres travelled	8.77	9.46	7.88%	6.42

² Confidence interval at 95%

Human Resource Management					
Indicator	October 2004 to September 2005	October 2005 to September 2006	Change	National mean	Ranked position nationally
Percentage of contracted hours lost to sickness for police officers	2.7%	2.1%	-0.6 p.p.	3.3%	3
Percentage of contracted hours lost to sickness for police staff	3.7%	2.8%	-0.9 p.p.	4.0%	4

Race and Diversity					
Indicator	October 2004 to September 2005	October 2005 to September 2006	Change	National mean	Ranked position nationally
% of female police officers	24.0%	22.3%	-1.7 p.p.	22.6%	24

APPENDIX 2: GLOSSARY

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACO	assistant chief officer
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ARV	armed response vehicle
ASB	anti-social behaviour
BATS	briefing and tasking system
BCS	British Crime Survey
BCU	basic command unit
BME	black and minority ethnic
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CDRP	crime and disorder reduction partnership
COG	chief officer group
CLDP	Core Leadership Development Programme
CP	corporate personnel
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CSCC	customer service crime centre
CTP	costed training plan
DCC	deputy chief constable
DIP	drugs intervention programme
ER	employee relations
ERO	evidence review officer
FME	force medical examiner
FPN	fixed penalty notice
GIS	geographical information system
HMI	Her Majesty's Inspector
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HR	human resource
IMU	incident management unit
iQuanta	a web-based tool for policing performance information and analysis, developed by the Police Standards Unit (PSU) of the Home Office
LAA	local area agreement
LCJB	local criminal justice board
L&D	learning and development
LPT	local policing team
MIT	major incident team

MSF	most similar force
NIM	national intelligence model
NMIS	National Management Information System
NP	neighbourhood policing
NSPIS	National Strategy for Police Information Systems
PCSO	police community support officer
PDR	performance development review
PPAF	police performance assessment framework
PPO	prolific and priority offender
PSA	public service agreement
PSU	Police Standards Unit
RPAF	resource performance assessment framework
SMT	senior management team
T&CG	tactical and co-ordination group
TIC	(offences) taken into account
TSB	training and supervision board
VCM	volume crime model
VCT	volume crime team
YOT	youth offending team